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Shopping During Extended Store
Hours: From No Shops to Go-Shops
THE DEVELOPMENT, EFFECTIVENESS, AND
IMPLICATIONS OF GO-SHOP PROVISIONS IN
CHANGE OF CONTROL TRANSACTIONS
Christina M. Sautter†
BUD FOX: How much is enough?
GORDON GEKKO: It’s not a question of enough, pal. It’s a zero-sum
game, somebody wins and somebody loses.
—Wall Street1

I.

INTRODUCTION

The question “How much is enough?” has likely
resonated through boardrooms for decades in the wake of the
Delaware Supreme Court’s 1986 landmark decision, Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,2 announcing that
once the sale of a company becomes inevitable, the board must
take steps to ensure the maximization of value for the benefit
of the stockholders.3 The Supreme Court forever altered the
corporate sales process by further stating that directors should
foster competitive bidding to obtain the highest price possible

†
Westerfield Fellow, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law; J.D.,
summa cum laude & Order of the Coif, Villanova University School of Law, 2002; B.S.,
summa cum laude, Florida State University, 1999. Many thanks to Professors Trey
Drury and Robert Miller for their comments and suggestions. Thank you also to Dr.
Heiko Schiwek and Jay Mirostaw for their comments and insights. In addition, I would
like to extend my gratitude to my colleagues, Kim D. Chanbonpin, for her comments
and support, and Vik Kanwar for his suggestions. Thank you also to the Villanova
University School of Law Faculty for allowing me to present this Article as a work-inprogress during their Faculty Workshop Series. Finally, thank you to Tim Kappel for
his research assistance. Naturally, the views and, particularly, the errors contained
herein are solely my own.
1
WALL STREET (Amercent Films, American Entertainment Partners L.P.,
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. 1987).
2
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
3
Id. at 182.
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for stockholders.4 Initially, this appeared to signal a movement
toward a purer auction model, or at least a more competitive
bidding process in the market for corporate control.5 Over the
past twenty years, however, dealmakers have devised various
tactics and sale methods in response to this perceived
movement.6
Similar to Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence, corporate
sale methods are not formed in a vacuum, but are products of
the periods in which they are developed. Revlon, for example, is
a direct result of the mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”)
landscape of the 1980s, which for many is best exemplified by
the 1987 movie Wall Street. This period was marked by
unprecedented deal volume, highly leveraged transactions,
hostile takeovers, and corporate raiders, like Gordon Gekko,
who often challenged entrenched management.7 The buyout
boom of the 1980s left a lasting impression on corporate case
law, as the Delaware courts issued a number of watershed
opinions addressing a board’s obligations to stockholders as
well as management and board greed. The cases stemmed from
stockholder allegations that boards and management resisted
deals offering large premiums in an effort to maintain their
jobs.8

4

Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183.
See Mark J. Loewenstein, Toward an Auction Market for Corporate Control
and the Demise of the Business Judgment Rule, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 66-68 (1989)
(describing the movement toward an auction model for corporate control).
6
The focus of this Article is on post-signing market checks and go-shop
provisions. For in-depth discussions of these sale methods, see infra Part II.C-E.
7
See Jason M. Klein, When the Board Should Just Say Yes to Management:
The Interplay Between the Decision of Whether to Conduct an Auction and Transaction
Structure, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN., Aug. 1999, at 45, 45-46 (describing the M&A
environment in the 1980s); Joseph S. Allerhand & Bradley R. Aronstam, New Wave of
M&A Litigation Attacks Private Equity Deals, 238 N.Y.L.J. 9 (July 9, 2007) (“[M]erger
and acquisition activity in the 1980s was epitomized by hostile takeovers and the
‘omnipresent specter’ of entrenched management . . . .”). During the early 1980s,
management buyouts (“MBOs”) were characterized by the sales of divisions of larger
companies, but the trend shifted in the mid-1980s to highly leveraged MBOs of
complete companies rather than divisions. Klein, supra, at 45-46. The trend shifted
again during the late 1980s when management utilized MBOs as defensive tactics
against corporate raiders. Id. at 46; see also Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How
Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1022 (1997) (stating that
management obtained job security through MBOs).
8
See Peter Lattman & Dana Cimilluca, Court Faults Buyouts—Delaware
Rulings Raise Disclosure Questions in Topps, Lear Deals, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2007, at
C1 (describing the legal claims arising from the 1980s buyout boom and recognizing
corporate raiders offered stockholders large premiums and promised to remove boards
and management).
5
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The furious dealmaking activity of the last few years
has led some to compare the current M&A environment to that
of the 1980s.9 In many respects, the comparison is a fair one as
there has been a resurgence of leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”),10
management buyouts (“MBOs”),11 and hostile takeovers.12 There
are, however, a number of subtle but important developments
that highlight the differences between the two decades. Unlike
the hostile transactions of the 1980s that were generally led by
corporate raiders, today’s hostile takeover attempts are
increasingly launched by strategic buyers and, more recently,
private equity buyers.13 In addition, corporate raiders have
been replaced by, or have simply transformed themselves into,
stockholder activists.14 For example, Carl Icahn, the
quintessential corporate raider—and real-life Gordon Gekko

9

See Rik Kirkland, Private Money, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2007, at 50 (comparing
the current prevalence of private equity leveraged buyouts to leveraged buyouts in the
1980s); Joe Nocera, From Raider to Activist, But Still Icahn, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007,
at C1 (quoting Peter J. Solomon, a prominent New York investment banker, as stating,
“We are in a carnivorous wave . . . . The last one was about greenmailing and corporate
raiding. This one is about private equity and activists.”).
10
An LBO is a takeover of a company in which an acquirer uses borrowed
funds to finance the transaction. Typically, the target company’s assets are used as
security for the debt the acquirer incurred in purchasing the target. In an LBO, the
acquirer profits by taking the company public with an initial public offering, or by
selling the company to another acquirer.
11
An MBO is a transaction in which the target company’s management
purchases the target’s publicly held shares and takes the company private. An MBO is
typically financed as a leveraged buyout.
12
See Philip Mills & Mutya Harsch, Hostile Takeovers: How to Avoid the
Jump, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 2006, at 44, 44-45 (describing increases in financial
sponsored deals and hostile activity globally).
13
See Igor Kirman, Takeover Law and Practice, in DOING DEALS 2007:
UNDERSTANDING THE NUTS & BOLTS OF TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE 9, 22 (PLI Corp.
Law & Practice Handbook Series No. 1594, 2007) (contrasting today’s hostile activity
involving strategic buyers to hostile deals in the 1970s and 1980s); see also In re
Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 198 (Del. Ch. 2007) (recognizing
that, in the early part of this decade, strategic buyers jumped competitors’ deals
and that the current trend is for private equity firms to outbid strategic buyers); In re
Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1008 (Del. Ch. 2005) (recognizing
that a marketplace exists “where strategic buyers have not felt shy about ‘jumping’
friendly deals crafted between their industry rivals”); ROBERT E. SPATT, THE FOUR
RING CIRCUS—ROUND ELEVEN; A FURTHER UPDATED VIEW OF THE MATING DANCE
AMONG ANNOUNCED MERGER PARTNERS AND AN UNSOLICITED SECOND OR THIRD
BIDDER 1, 1-9 (Mar. 17, 2007), available at http://stblaw.com/content/publications/
publications23_0.pdf (listing examples of U.S. and foreign transactions from 1994 to
early 2007 in which a deal was jumped or a jump was attempted).
14
See Kirman, supra note 13, at 27-28 (discussing increase in stockholder
activism).
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figure of the 1980s—has now embraced the role of stockholder
activist.15
Recent years have seen the unprecedented growth of
M&A activity and the re-emergence of private equity firms
playing an enhanced role in M&A deals. For example, in 2006,
global deal volume totaled $3.79 trillion with private equity
buyouts accounting for nearly a fifth of all deals.16 Dealmakers
began 2007 at an even more accelerated pace. During the first
half of the year, deal volume totaled $1.005 trillion in the
United States alone, representing a 36% increase from the
same period in 2006 and marking the first time that M&A
activity has ever reached that level in the first half of any
year.17 During the first half of 2007, private equity firmsponsored LBOs accounted for $644 billion worth of deals
worldwide.18 This is up 95.1% from 2006 and accounts for 34%
of the $1.005 trillion of U.S. deal activity and nearly a quarter
of all merger activity worldwide.19 Although recent months
have seen turmoil in the credit markets that are so vital to
private equity transactions and dealmaking generally, record
transaction volume demonstrates that we have been in the
midst of a distinctive time for deal activity over the past few
years.
Like the unique takeover activity of the 1980s, the
recent M&A boom has prompted the Delaware courts to
address the actions, and sometimes the alleged greed, of

15
See Nocera, supra note 9, at C1 (describing Icahn’s transition from
corporate raider to stockholder activist); see also William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds
and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1377-79 (2007) (describing recent
example of Icahn’s stockholder activism during proposed Mylan Laboratories-King
Pharmaceuticals deal).
16
Heather Timmons, The Year That Made Deal Makers Giddy, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2007, at C6 (citing Thomson Financial statistics regarding 2006 deal flow and
indicating that another statistics firm, Dealogic, has stated that 2006 deal flow was
worth even more, at $3.98 trillion). According to Thomson Financial, the $3.79 trillion
figure represents an increase of 38% from 2005. Id.
17
See Jessica Hall, U.S. Merger Volume Hits Record Despite Soft
June, REUTERS, June 28, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/mergersNews/idUSN
2837929220070628 (citing Dealogic statistics).
18
Grace Wong, Private Equity: Scrooge No Longer, CNNMONEY.COM,
July 10, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/07/10/markets/pe_philanthropy/index.htm
(citing Thomson Financial statistics).
19
Id. (citing Thomson Financial statistics that the number of private equity
deals accounted for a quarter of all M&A deals worldwide and represented a 95.1%
increase from the previous year); Grace Wong, Private Equity: The Beat Goes On,
CNNMONEY.COM, July 4, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/07/04/markets/pe_what_
next/index.htm (citing Dealogic statistics that private equity buyouts accounted for
34% of $1 trillion U.S. deal activity in the first six months of 2007).
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corporate management and boards.20 This time the cases often
involve allegations by stockholders that boards have favored
private equity buyers who are seeking to retain management
with enhanced compensation packages.21 Like the 1980s,
today’s high deal volume and new dealmakers are creating a
new set of issues for courts to address, including new sale
methods that purportedly enable boards to better satisfy their
Revlon duties.22
Perhaps the most prominent and controversial among
these new deal tactics are go-shop provisions. Unlike “no shop”
or “window shop” provisions—deal protection devices which
prevent a target company from actively soliciting bids following
the signing of a definitive agreement—go-shop provisions
permit a target company to actively solicit alternative bidders
for a limited period after entering into a definitive agreement
with an acquirer.23 Since Revlon, dealmakers have relied
primarily on pre-signing public auctions or targeted market
canvasses in an effort to obtain the highest possible price for
stockholders.24 Because these sale methods are completed presigning, M&A agreements generally include a “fiduciary out”25
that enables the target board to consider unsolicited third
party offers received between signing and receipt of stockholder
approval. However, the board may only consider the third

20
This Article focuses solely on Delaware law because of Delaware’s welldeveloped body of corporate case law, its continuing influence over other states’
corporate laws, and its dominant position in the incorporation market. For example,
over 50% of U.S. corporations that are currently traded on the New York Stock
Exchange and NASDAQ, and 61% of Fortune 500 companies, are incorporated in
Delaware. DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, DEL. DEP’T OF STATE, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT,
http://www.corp.delaware.gov (search for “2006 Annual Report”).
21
See Lattman & Cimilluca, supra note 8, at C1 (“In the current buyout
craze, many buyout firms retain the management by offering rich pay packages and a
stake in the newly private entity.”).
22
See Grace Wong, Rival Bidders Emerge for Big Buyouts, CNNMONEY.COM,
Mar. 19, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/19/markets/pe_deals/index.htm [hereinafter Rival Bidders] (“The deal landscape may be growing more intense, but private
equity firms—considered some of the savviest deal makers on Wall Street—
undoubtedly are looking out for ways to stay one step ahead of their rivals.”).
23
See Dennis J. Block, Public Company M&A: Recent Developments in
Corporate Control, Protective Mechanisms and Other Deal Protection Techniques, in
CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 2007: CURRENT OFFENSIVE & DEFENSIVE
STRATEGIES IN M&A TRANSACTIONS, at 7, 106-07 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Series No. 1584, 2007) (differentiating no shops and go-shops).
24
See infra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing how public auctions
and market canvasses are the best ways to ensure the maximization of stockholder
value).
25
For a description of “fiduciary out” provisions, see infra Part II.A.2.
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party offer if it is, or may become, a superior offer.26 Thus, in
the typical deal, a target is “closed for business” and must
ignore advances from third parties unless an unsolicited
superior proposal is received. By contrast, go-shop provisions
effectively allow a target to extend its typical “store hours” and
actively seek a better deal during the time in which it
otherwise would have been officially closed for business.
Although go-shop provisions initially surfaced during
the late 1980s, the provisions received scant attention from the
M&A community until dealmakers began utilizing the
provisions with increasing frequency over the past three years.
This increased use of go-shop provisions has triggered a debate
among commentators as to the effectiveness of the provisions
and have led some to question whether the provisions are
merely “window dressing” enabling boards to claim that they
have satisfied their duty to maximize stockholder value.27
This Article demonstrates, through an examination of
the go-shop provision’s development, that despite Revlon,
Delaware courts have failed to take affirmative steps to
promote the maximization of stockholder value. Furthermore,
this Article argues that the ability of a company to extend its
“store hours” by actively shopping post-signing has the same
end result with respect to value maximization as the typical
post-signing market check that relies solely on a no shop
provision coupled with a fiduciary out. Part II of the Article
explores the evolution of go-shop provisions.28 The section
begins with a general discussion of deal protection devices with
a particular focus on no shop and window shop provisions, the
predecessors to the go-shop, and then moves into a more
specific description of the Delaware courts’ treatment of postsigning market checks in light of Revlon and its progeny.29 The
26

See infra notes 50-51 and 86 and accompanying text (describing fiduciary
outs and use of fiduciary outs). Merger agreements differ on what constitutes a
“superior offer,” with factors such as the form of consideration, certainty of closing, and
regulatory issues often playing an important role. However, this Article assumes that
the principal determination of whether an offer is superior is the value of consideration
paid.
27
See Mark A. Morton, Partner, & Roxanne L. Houtman, Assoc., Potter
Anderson & Corroon LLP, Go-Shops: Market Check Magic or Mirage? 1, 7-8 (May 2007),
www.potteranderson.com/assets/attachments/Potter_Anderson_Go-Shops__rev.pdf
(questioning whether go-shop provisions are effective or are “window dressing”). For a
further discussion regarding the effectiveness of go-shop provisions, see infra Part
III.A.
28
See infra Part II (describing the evolution of the go-shop).
29
See infra Part II.A-C.
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section ends with a discussion of the development of go-shop
provisions.30 Part III discusses the effectiveness of go-shop
provisions, including critics’ arguments that the provisions
have a chilling effect on the bidding process.31 This section also
includes an examination of In re Topps Co. Shareholders
Litigation and In re Lear Corp. Shareholders Litigation, the
most recent Delaware cases to specifically address and validate
go-shop provisions.32 Part IV of this Article contends that,
despite facial differences, go-shop provisions and post-signing
market checks are effectively the same.33 The Delaware courts’
continuing validation of both post-signing market checks and
go-shop provisions reveal the courts’ hesitancy in disrupting
signed transactions and has resulted in a movement away from
Delaware’s policy that directors should act as auctioneers and
conduct a sale process that will result in the maximization of
stockholder value. Thus, I contend that this continued trend in
Delaware jurisprudence, including the Delaware Court of
Chancery’s validation of go-shop provisions, signals the death
of the policies, originally set forth in Revlon, promoting a more
competitive sale process, and, ultimately, higher value
realization for stockholders.
II.

THE RISE OF GO-SHOP PROVISIONS

A.

Deal Protection Generally

To fully appreciate no shops, market checks, and goshops, one must first understand the reasons that dealmakers
use deal protection devices generally and how typical deal
protection devices are used in combination. In classic consumer
shopping situations, once a consumer finds and selects a
desired product at a price he or she is willing to pay, the
consumer can generally rest assured that the time spent and
money invested thus far is not for naught. In such situations,
the time between the selection of a product and the exchange of
money and ownership is usually limited, and thus the risk that
an interloper will upset the transaction is likewise extremely
small or, in most cases, nonexistent. However, the same does
not hold true in the M&A world.
30
31
32
33

See infra Part II.D-E.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part IV.
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Unlike everyday consumer transactions, the purchase of
a public company cannot be completed prior to the fulfillment
of certain closing conditions. These conditions include
stockholder approval, the preparation and filing of a proxy
statement, and, in many cases, regulatory approval, including
antitrust approvals, the registration of securities to be issued
in connection with the transaction and other required third
party consents.34 Because of the time needed to accomplish
these required closing conditions, the interim period between
signing the transaction agreement and closing the transaction
can stretch anywhere from several weeks to several months, or
beyond.35
By the time of signing, the acquirer has devoted a
significant amount of time and money to identifying the target
and to assessing the target’s value.36 In addition to traditional
sunk costs that are associated with identifying and assessing
the value of the target, commentators have also identified
operational costs and reputational costs that the initial
acquirer may incur in the event that the transaction is not
completed. For example, Professor Guhan Subramanian has
argued that if a deal is not completed, the initial acquirer may
suffer a decrease in its own stock price and may be viewed as
“weak” in the market for corporate control.37 Such a reputation
for weakness may result in the reduction of future profit
opportunities for the acquirer because other bidders may be
more willing to enter into a future bidding contest against a
“weak” bidder.38 Because of these potential costs, the acquirer
will seek to prevent its proposed transaction from being
interrupted, or “jumped,” by a third party.

34

See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in
Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 241 n.3 (1990) (listing closing
conditions).
35
See id. at 241 (explaining there is generally a two to four month period
between signing and closing); John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side
Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 310 (2000) (stating
that the period between signing and closing ranges from a minimum of thirty days to
up to six months).
36
See Bainbridge, supra note 34, at 242 (describing purchaser’s sunk costs).
37
See Guhan Subramanian, The Drivers of Market Efficiency in Revlon
Transactions, 28 J. CORP. L. 691, 701-02 (2003) (describing potential operational and
reputational costs that acquirer may incur in the event of a failed deal).
38
See id. at 702 (describing reputational costs); see also Coates &
Subramanian, supra note 35, at 360 (stating that bidders may decide not to enter
future auctions if a “tough” bidder has already entered the bidding contest, or may drop
out if a tough bidder enters).
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On the other hand, the target’s board has an obligation
to act in the best interests of the business and must fulfill its
fiduciary duties to the corporation’s stockholders.39 In some
cases, this may mean considering options that arise after the
signing of a definitive transaction agreement as a result of a
deal being “jumped.” In addition, the target’s stockholders may
not approve the proposed transaction for any reason, including
the existence of a superior third party bid. Thus, a definitive
agreement between the initial acquirer and the target is not
necessarily a “sure thing” because it does not effectively bind
the target to the transaction.40 This tension between the initial
acquirer’s costs and the non-binding nature of the agreement
on the target and its stockholders has given rise to deal
protection devices. As the name suggests, deal protection
devices include a variety of contractual terms that are
incorporated into a definitive agreement with the goal of
protecting a deal from being “jumped” by a third party by
making the third party’s bid riskier and more expensive.41 The
inclusion of at least some combination of deal protection
devices has become de rigueur in public M&A transactions.42
The following section is a brief summary of some typical
deal protection devices, including no shops, window shops, no
talk provisions, termination or break-up fees, and matching
rights. In addition, this section also focuses on “fiduciary outs,”
which act as important exceptions to deal protection devices.
This section, as well as the remainder of this Article, addresses
how dealmakers use these devices in combination and how the
Delaware courts have treated the results of such combinations.

39
For a discussion of a board’s fiduciary duties in a change of control context,
see infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
40
See note 86 and accompanying text. There also are reasons why the target
may want a binding definitive agreement. For example, if the acquirer backs out, the
target risks being left “in play” without another buyer. Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection
Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1900-01 (2003)
(describing a target’s reasons for avoiding non-binding agreements). In addition, an
unsolicited bid from a financial buyer may not present the same opportunities for
synergy that the signed deal with a strategic buyer may be capable of. See id.
41
See id. at 1902-03 (describing why deal protection mechanisms are used);
see also McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 506 n.62 (Del. Ch. 2000) (stating
that deal protection devices make “it more difficult and more expensive to consummate
a competing transaction and . . . provid[e] compensation to the odd company out if such
an alternative deal nonetheless occurs”).
42
See Block, supra note 23, at 89 (stating that acquirers and targets will
often bargain for deal protection devices); Coates & Subramanian, supra note 35, at
315 (indicating that, by 1998, lock-ups appeared in 80% of deals and termination fees
appeared in 70% of deals).
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1. No Shop Provisions, Window Shop Provisions, and
No Talk Provisions
Although the term “no shop” can refer to a variety of
covenants in an M&A agreement, pure no shop provisions
prevent a target’s board from actively soliciting bids after the
target has entered into a definitive agreement with an initial
acquirer.43 Similarly, window shop provisions prevent a target
from actively soliciting bids from third parties after the signing
of a definitive agreement.44 However, a window shop provision
contains a fiduciary out that allows the target’s board to
negotiate with, provide due diligence materials to, and, if
appropriate, ultimately accept a bid from a third party that
makes an unsolicited offer if taking such action is necessary to
avoid a breach of the board’s fiduciary duties.45 Typically,
window shop provisions require that the unsolicited third party
bid meet certain criteria in order to exercise the fiduciary out;
among these requirements is that the third party bid be
deemed a superior proposal to that of the incumbent bidder.46
Although technically slightly different, the terms “no shop” and
“window shop” are frequently referred to interchangeably and
will be referred to interchangeably throughout this Article.
Conversely, no talk provisions prevent the target from
actively soliciting potential third party bids and from
negotiating with, or providing due diligence or other
information to, a third party who has submitted an unsolicited
offer, despite the terms of the unsolicited offer.47 In essence, as
the name suggests, no talk provisions prevent targets from
speaking with interested third parties altogether, unless the
target has permission from the initial acquirer. Practitioners
have viewed no talk provisions that do not contain fiduciary
outs as per se invalid because they can prevent a target’s board
43
Block, supra note 23, at 91. Block indicates that pure no shops are
generally not permissible in transactions resulting in a change of control of the target
unless the target’s board has already fulfilled their Revlon duties by conducting an
auction. Id. at 93. For a further discussion of a board’s Revlon duties and related sale
methods, see infra notes 63-86 and accompanying text.
44
Block, supra note 23, at 91.
45
Id. For a further discussion of fiduciary out clauses, see discussion infra
Part II.A.2.
46
See Block, supra note 23, at 92 (listing typical window shop fiduciary out
requirements).
47
See id. at 91 (describing no talk provisions); Thanos Panagopoulos,
Thinking Inside the Box: Analyzing Judicial Scrutiny of Deal Protection Devices in
Delaware, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 437, 446 (2006) (same).
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from fulfilling their fiduciary duties, which the Delaware Court
of Chancery has stated is the “legal equivalent of willful
blindness.”48
Delaware courts analyze the validity of no shop
provisions based on the particular facts and circumstances of a
given case. Accordingly, courts will uphold no shop provisions
where they “do not foreclose other offers, but operate merely to
afford some protection to prevent disruption of the Agreement
by proposals from third parties that are neither bona fide nor
likely to result in a higher transaction.”49
2. Fiduciary Outs
Although fiduciary outs are not deal protection devices,
fiduciary outs are used with deal protection devices to ensure
the validity of the devices. Fiduciary outs are contractual
clauses that allow the target to perform an act that the
agreement otherwise forbids (or to refrain from doing an act
that the contract requires) if the performance of the forbidden
act (or non-performance of the required act) would otherwise
result in a violation of a board’s fiduciary duties.50 When a
board exercises its fiduciary out, the resulting act, or failure to
act, is not considered to be a contractual breach.51 Thus, the
fiduciary out acts as a safe harbor to the deal protection
mechanism.
3. Termination or Break-Up Fees
No shops are often paired with termination or break-up
fees that are payable by the target to the incumbent bidder

48

Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., Nos. CIV. A. 17398,
CIV. A. 17383, CIV. A. 17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) (“Notalk provisions . . . are troubling precisely because they prevent a board from meeting
its duty to make an informed judgment with respect to even considering whether to
negotiate with a third party.”); see also Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 10609 (Del. Ch. 1999) (suggesting that no talk provisions are invalid); Karl L. Balz, NoShop Clauses, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 513, 545 (2003) (describing the validity of no talk
provisions and scenarios where no talk provisions may be deemed valid).
49
Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC Holdings, Inc., 729 A.2d 280, 291
(Del. Ch. 1998).
50
See William T. Allen, Understanding Fiduciary Outs: The What and the
Why of an Anomalous Concept, 55 BUS. LAW. 653, 653-54 (2000) (defining fiduciary
outs).
51
See id. at 654.
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upon the occurrence of specific circumstances.52 Typical
triggering events include the termination of an agreement
following (1) the target board’s withdrawal, modification or
change in its recommendation of the proposed transaction; (2)
the target board’s recommendation of a competing proposal; (3)
the target board’s exercise of a fiduciary out in favor of a
superior proposal; or (4) the stockholders’ failure to approve the
proposed transaction.53 Delaware courts have upheld
termination fees ranging from 1% to 6% of the target’s equity
value.54 Generally, however, dealmakers include termination
fees ranging from 1% to 5% of transaction value, with a median
of approximately 2.6% to 3%.55
In the event that a deal falls through, termination fees
guarantee that the initial acquirer will at least be compensated
for the fees and expenses that it incurred in negotiating
the underlying agreement.56 Although the target incurs the
termination fee, the fee is considered a transaction cost for

52

Termination fees can also be payable by an acquirer to the target in certain
situations, including where the acquirer breaches an agreement and fails to
consummate the transaction. Fees payable by the acquirer to a target are known as
reverse termination fees.
53
See Block, supra note 23, at 115-16 (describing typical triggering events for
termination fees).
54
See id. at 110 (describing current practices relating to termination fees).
The courts treat termination fees as liquidated damages and rely on authority stating
that liquidated damage provisions equal to between 1% and 5% of the proposed
acquisition price are reasonable. See Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Margaux, Inc., 674 A.2d
889, 897 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (citing Bainbridge, supra note 34, at 245). Despite
treating termination fees as liquidated damages, the Delaware courts refuse to issue a
bright-line rule regarding the acceptable percentage of termination fees. See La. Mun.
Police Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1181 n.10 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(“Though a ‘3% rule’ for termination fees might be convenient for transaction planners,
it is simply too blunt an instrument, too subject to abuse, for this Court to bless as a
blanket rule.”). However, in dicta, the Delaware Court of Chancery has indicated that a
termination fee of 6.3% “certainly seems to stretch the definition of range of
reasonableness and probably stretches the definition beyond its breaking point.” Phelps
Dodge, Nos. CIV. A. 17398, CIV. A. 17383, CIV. A. 17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *2. For
further examples of termination fees that the Delaware Court of Chancery have
upheld, see infra note 112.
55
See Block, supra note 23, at 110 (describing typical termination fees).
56
See Kysor Indus., 674 A.2d at 897 (stating that termination fees act as a
form of reimbursement for the initial bidder’s lost opportunities and expenditures);
Panagopoulos, supra note 47, at 445 (describing the purposes of termination fees).
Generally, “the more closely a fee resembles the actual and economic costs incurred by
a party the more likely it is to be upheld by a court.” Gregory V. Varallo & Srinivas M.
Raju, A Process Based Model for Analyzing Deal Protection Measures, 55 BUS. LAW.
1609, 1613 (2000).
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the topping bidder.57 Thus, termination fees may act as
disincentives for third parties who are considering “jumping” a
deal because they make the topping bid more expensive.58
4. Matching Rights
In addition to termination fees, no shops are commonly
paired with matching rights, also referred to as topping or lastlook rights. Matching rights require the target to inform the
incumbent bidder of a superior proposal and allow the
incumbent bidder a period during which the incumbent bidder
may match, or exceed, the unsolicited superior proposal.59 Thus,
matching rights have the capability of creating a post-signing
bidding war between the initial acquirer and one or more
interlopers who have submitted superior proposals.
Matching rights act as deal protection devices because
they deter potential bidders from “jumping in” post-signing
since potential bidders are aware that the initial acquirer may
submit another bid matching, or exceeding, the superior
proposal.60
5. Go-Shop Provisions
As previously discussed, go-shop provisions appear to be
the opposite of no shop provisions.61 Go-shops allow a target
to actively solicit buyers after the target has already entered
into a definitive agreement with a purchaser. Although
commentators tend to refer to go-shop provisions as deal
protection devices, I contend that go-shops are more similar to
fiduciary outs because they allow the target company to
57

See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938 (Del. 2003)
(“To the extent that defensive measures are economic and reasonable, they may become
an increased cost to the proponent of any subsequent transaction.”).
58
See Panagopoulos, supra note 47, at 445; Judd F. Sneirson, Merger
Agreements, Termination Fees, and the Contract-Corporate Tension, 2002 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 573, 581-82 (providing examples illustrating how termination fees deter topping
bids).
59
See Block, supra note 23, at 117 (describing typical matching rights).
Generally, matching rights also require the target to inform the initial acquirer of the
identity of the person who submitted the superior proposal. Id. In addition, the initial
acquirer is typically given three business days’ notice of a possible termination. Id.
Once the initial acquirer is given notice, the matching rights provision usually requires
that the target negotiate in good faith with the initial acquirer so that the initial
acquirer may make a superior proposal. Id.
60
Id.
61
See infra Part IV.
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actively solicit other bidders following signing and could result
in the termination of an agreement in favor of a superior
proposal.62 A more in-depth discussion of the typical
characteristics of go-shop provisions is set forth in Part II.E.
B.

Fiduciary Duties of the Board

Over the past several years, practitioners, academics,
and jurists have wrestled with the judicial standard of review
applicable to deal protection devices, an issue that this Article
does not seek to address.63 However, it is clear since Revlon
that once a board of directors contemplates a transaction that
will cause either a change in corporate control64 or a breakup
of the corporate entity, the board is obligated to seek the
best present value reasonably available to stockholders.65
62
See, e.g., Block, supra note 23, at 91, 106 (grouping go-shop provisions with
deal protection devices).
63
See Gregory V. Varallo & Srinivas M. Raju, A Fresh Look at Deal
Protection Devices: Out from the Shadow of the Omnipresent Specter, 26 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 975, 975-76 (2001) (stating that academics, practitioners, and jurists have long
debated the appropriate standard of review for deal protection devices and noting that
the Delaware Court of Chancery has struggled with the issue); see also Balz, supra note
48, at 527-44 (analyzing the appropriate standard of review applicable to no shop
provisions); Stephen J. Lubben & Alana J. Darnell, Delaware’s Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 589, 627 (2006) (arguing that the duty of care standard should be applied to
deal protection devices unless the merger is a defensive measure); Panagopoulos, supra
note 47, at 448-71 (examining and critiquing the judicial standards applicable to deal
protection devices). See generally Symposium, Judicial Standards of Review of
Corporate Fiduciary Action, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 995, 1059-82 (2001) (transcript of a
symposium session at which jurists, practitioners, and scholars debated the standards
of review applicable to corporate actions and, in particular, to deal protection devices).
64
This Article does not seek to define what constitutes a “change of control
transaction,” which Delaware jurists recognize to be an unanswered question. See
William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in
Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 895 n.130 (2001) (former
chancellor and his co-authors recognizing that courts have yet to fully address what
constitutes a change of control under Delaware law); see also In re TW Servs., Inc.
S’holders Litig., CIV. A. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2,
1989) (asking when Revlon duties apply).
65
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986) (holding that a board’s act of authorizing management to negotiate a
merger or buyout is a recognition that the company is for sale and changes the board’s
duty from the “preservation of . . . a corporate entity to the maximization of the
company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit”); see also Allen et al., supra note
64, at 894 (“Where directors have decided to commit the corporation to a change of
control transaction, their actions must be evaluated solely by reference to their duty to
obtain the highest value reasonably available.”). The Delaware Supreme Court has
held that Revlon duties attach

when a corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or
to effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the
company. . . . [or where], in response to a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its
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Additionally, a board’s favoritism of a particular bidder over
another is permitted only if the board’s objective is to maximize
the stockholders’ value of their shares.66 However, the board
need not maintain a “level playing field” at all times.67 The
Supreme Court has recognized that, because today’s corporate
and financial environment is continuously evolving, “no single
blueprint” exists for a board to satisfy its Revlon duties.68
Although “no single blueprint” exists, a transaction with
the highest bidder following a full public auction is the most
desirable way in which a board can satisfy Revlon’s enhanced
scrutiny test.69 In fact, the Delaware Supreme Court held that
in a change of control situation, “a board’s primary duty
becomes that of an auctioneer responsible for selling the
company to the highest bidder.”70 The board is also required to
take steps that foster, rather than impede, bidding, which will
presumably result in the maximization of stockholder value.71
Following Revlon, the Delaware courts have held that a
full-blown public auction is not necessarily a requirement for
change of control transactions for all corporations under
Delaware law.72 Indeed, there are certain situations in which

long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the
breakup of the company.
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990) (citation
omitted).
66
In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 64 (Del. Ch. 2007).
67
See In re TW Servs., 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (holding that there is no duty to
conduct an auction or maintain a “level playing field” when a company is for sale).
68
Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).
69
See Morton & Houtman, supra note 27, at 1 (stating that transactions with
the highest bidder after either a full public auction or a slightly more limited market
check in which a number of bidders are contacted directly and participate in bidding
likely satisfies a board’s Revlon duties); Mark W. Peters et al., Emergence of the “GoShop,” 11 WALLSTREETLAYWER.COM: SEC. ELECTRONIC AGE 7 (2007) (indicating that
the most desirable way for the board of a target to fulfill its Revlon duties is to conduct
a full public auction and enter into an agreement with the bidder making the highest
offer). However, even when a full-blown public auction is conducted, the definitive
agreement must still contain a fiduciary out. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
70
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.
71
See id. at 183 (stating that the result of the lock-up in Revlon “was not to
foster bidding, but to destroy it”).
72
See Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286 (“Revlon does not demand that every change
in the control of a Delaware corporation be preceded by a heated bidding contest.”); In
re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1000 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[T]he
[Delaware] Supreme Court has held that the duty to take reasonable steps to secure
the highest immediately available price does not invariably require a board to conduct
an auction process or even a targeted market canvass in the first instance,
emphasizing that there is ‘no single blue-print’ for fulfilling the duty to maximize
value.”). However, small micro-cap companies may not be able to rely on a limited

540

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:2

a public auction is not desirable, as boards may view public
auctions as placing the company at a competitive disadvantage.73 For example, if a company conducts a public auction, the
company risks losing employees, customers and suppliers.74 In
addition, the company also runs the risk of being viewed by the
market for corporate control as “damaged goods” if the
company does not receive any indications of interest or if the
board determines that the offers it receives are inadequate.75
Thus, in the event of a failed auction, it may take some time for
a company to successfully sell itself.76 Furthermore, although
potential bidders are required to execute confidentiality
agreements before being provided with a confidential offering
memorandum or commencing due diligence, companies also
risk disclosure of proprietary or sensitive information to the
public and to other competitors.77 In addition, in some cases,
the target may have already been approached by a potential
purchaser whose bid may be lost if the target board were to
choose to engage in a full blown auction.78 As a result, target
boards may be faced with a situation in which they are
interested in exploring change of control possibilities but do not
desire to actively pursue a public auction.
In these situations, targets often choose to engage in a
more limited pre-signing market canvass.79 That is, a target, or
public auction or post-signing market check. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying
text.
73
The Delaware Court of Chancery also recognizes the potential risks
involved with a public auction. See In re MONY Group Inc. S’holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9,
21 (Del. Ch. 2004) (recognizing benefits to single bidder approaches).
74
See Peters et al., supra note 69 (listing reasons why boards choose not to
conduct public bidding processes).
75
Heath Price Tarbert, Merger Breakup Fees: A Critical Challenge to AngloAmerican Corporate Law, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 627, 633-34 (2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing F. George Davitt, Orchestrating Takeover Talks: The
Corporate Board, SF86 ALI-ABA 677 (2001)) (describing the possibility that customers,
suppliers, and potential acquirers may view a target as “damaged goods” upon the
failure of a transaction).
76
See Embarking on the Sale Process, in ABA COMMITTEE ON NEGOTIATED
ACQUISITIONS, THE M&A PROCESS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE BUSINESS LAWYER 93,
93-94 (2005) (detailing the disadvantages of auctions, including the length of time it
takes to sell a company after a failed auction).
77
See In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 62 (Del. Ch. 2007) (noting
the target’s “legitimate proprietary concerns” about turning over information to a
competitor).
78
See, e.g., id. at 61 (stating that the buyer’s bid was contingent on the target
not conducting a public auction); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 104 (Del.
Ch. 2007) (same).
79
See Morton & Houtman, supra note 27, at 1 (stating that a transaction
with the highest bidder occurring after a more limited market check in which a number
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more likely its financial advisor, will contact a select group of
potential bidders, who may be interested in purchasing the
target. Because only a limited number of potential purchasers
are contacted, the risks associated with a pre-signing market
canvass are not as great as with a public auction since the
target company has not been placed “on the auction block.”
In addition to a public auction or a more limited presigning market canvass, Delaware courts have repeatedly
validated a target board’s more exclusive reliance on a no shop
with a fiduciary out or a window shop provision,80 also known
as a post-signing market check. This alternative, as previously
discussed,81 permits the target to terminate the definitive
agreement in favor of an unsolicited proposal that would
result in a better deal with a third party. As Part II.C will
demonstrate, the Delaware courts’ repeated blessing of a
target’s reliance on post-signing market checks in the absence
of a public auction or targeted market canvass has made the
post-signing market check a third sale method for targets. It is
worth noting, however, that recent Delaware jurisprudence
indicates that small micro-cap companies82 may need to engage
in a more complete targeted market canvass rather than rely
on a post-signing market check.83 In such a situation, the
rationale for a more complete pre-signing market canvass is
that micro-cap companies do not attract as much attention
from the market for corporate control as their large-cap
counterparts attract and micro-cap companies are less likely to
of bidders are contacted directly and participate in bidding likely satisfies a board’s
Revlon duties).
80
See, e.g., In re MONY Group Inc. S’holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 23-24 (Del.
Ch. 2004); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d 691, 705-07 (Del. Ch. 2001); In re Fort
Howard Corp. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 9991, 1988 WL 83147, at *12-13 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 8, 1988).
81
See discussion supra Part II.A.1 (describing no shop and window shop
provisions).
82
According to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s proposed
regulation of smaller companies, micro-cap companies are “companies whose
outstanding common stock (or equivalent) in the aggregate comprises the lowest 1% of
total U.S. equity market capitalization” or, in other words, those companies whose
market capitalization is less than approximately $128.2 million. Exposure Draft of
Final Report of Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies, 71 Fed. Reg.
11,090, 11,092 (May 3, 2006). Under the same recommendation, large-cap companies
are those companies whose outstanding common stock (or equivalent) accounts for 94%
of total U.S. equity market capitalization or, in other words, those companies whose
market capitalization is more than approximately $787.1 million. See id. (table).
83
See In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 197-99 (Del.
Ch. 2007) (finding that targeting of private equity buyers and not strategic buyers was
likely a breach of Revlon duties).
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be hostile takeover targets.84 Thus, the Delaware Court of
Chancery found that a micro-cap company’s limited pre-signing
market canvass and the reliance on a post-signing market
check did not adequately fulfill a board’s duties to maximize
stockholder value.85 Nonetheless, even when a large-cap or
micro-cap company has engaged in a public auction or limited
pre-signing market check, agreements must still contain a
fiduciary out in order to allow the target board to fulfill its
Revlon duties between signing and the stockholders’ approval
of the proposed transaction.86
C.

Before the Rise of the Go-Shop: Post-Signing Market
Checks

In the wake of Revlon, Delaware courts have repeatedly
addressed the intensity of the post-signing market check
necessary to satisfy a board’s Revlon duties in the absence of a
public auction or other pre-signing market canvass, or in the
event that a target conducted only a very limited market
canvass.87 However, the courts, and in particular the Delaware
Court of Chancery, are constrained by the context in which
these cases arise. The plaintiffs in these cases are typically the
84
Id. at 197-98; see also In re Lear, 926 A.2d at 123 n.22 (stating that
strategic buyers of micro-cap companies in niche markets are not likely to make
unsolicited proposals without prior discussions or information).
85
In re Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 199.
86
See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938 (Del. 2003)
(“The directors of a Delaware corporation have a continuing obligation to discharge
their fiduciary responsibilities, as future circumstances develop, after a merger
agreement is announced.”). In Omnicare, the majority opinion made it clear that the
target company’s board of directors was required to negotiate a fiduciary out clause to
protect its stockholders in the event that the proposed transaction became an inferior
offer. Id. The majority stated that by failing to include a fiduciary out clause, the target
board had effectively “disabled itself from exercising its own fiduciary obligations at a
time when the board’s own judgment is most important, i.e., receipt of a subsequent
superior offer.” Id.
87
See, e.g., In re MONY Group Inc. S’holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 23-24 (Del.
Ch. 2004); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 705-07 (Del. Ch.
2001); Kohls v. Duthie, 765 A.2d 1274, 1285 (Del. Ch. 2000); Goodwin v. Live Entm’t,
Inc., No. Civ.A. 15765, 1999 WL 64265, at *23 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 1999); Matador
Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC Holdings, Inc., 729 A.2d 280, 291 (Del. Ch. 1998); In re
MCA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 598 A.2d 687, 693 (Del. Ch. 1991); In re Vitalink Commc’ns
Corp. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 12085, 1991 WL 238816, at *7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8,
1991); Roberts v. Gen. Instrument Corp., Civ. A. No. 11639, 1990 WL 118356, at *8-9
(Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990); Braunschweiger v. Am. Home Shield Corp., Civ. A. No. 10755,
1989 WL 128571, at *6-7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1989); In re KDI Corp. S’holders Litig., Civ.
A. No. 10,278, 1988 WL 116448, at *5-7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 1988); In re Fort Howard
Corp. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 9991, 1988 WL 83147, at *12-13 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8,
1988).
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stockholders of a target company or a scorned third party
bidder who raise challenges to the market check in a motion
seeking to enjoin an impending merger. The courts thus view
these cases from the position of a Monday morning sports
commentator, attempting to determine whether the board’s
actions were reasonable, not perfect, in light of the
circumstances at the time of the decision.88 In the words of Vice
Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Court of Chancery, “[T]his
reasonableness review is more searching than rationality
review, and there is less tolerance for slack by the directors.”89
As a result, the trend in Delaware jurisprudence is to consider
the sale process as a whole. The courts consider a variety of
factors to determine whether the sale process used resulted in
a transaction that maximizes stockholder value. Among these
factors are the target’s pre-signing market position;90 whether
the special committee, if one was formed, was truly
independent and how the special committee conducted the sale
process;91 whether a truly independent financial advisor was
engaged;92 and whether the stockholders were fully informed of
the sale process.93
The emphasis on this myriad of factors appears to have
shifted the Delaware courts’ attention away from taking
affirmative steps to promote the maximization of stockholder
value. As mentioned previously, Delaware jurisprudence over
88
See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del.
1994) (“[C]ourt[s] applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the
directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision. If a board selected one of
several reasonable alternatives, a court should not second-guess that choice even
though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent events may have cast doubt on
the board’s determination.” (emphasis omitted)); In re Lear, 926 A.2d at 118
(“Reasonableness, not perfection, measured in business terms relevant to value
creation, rather than by what creates the most sterile smell, is the metric.”).
89
In re Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 192.
90
See, e.g., In re Lear, 926 A.2d at 118-19 (considering investments made in
the company and elimination of poison pill as indications to the market that the
company was for sale); In re Pennaco, 787 A.2d at 705 (considering the target’s position
in the market for corporate control, including whether strategic buyers had expressed
interest in the company).
91
See, e.g., In re Fort Howard, 1988 WL 83147, at *12 (examining special
committee’s actions).
92
See, e.g., In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1006 n.46
(Del. Ch. 2005) (commenting on fees that the investment bank stood to gain if the
target chose to go with a particular transaction and stating that “[i]n general . . . it is
advisable that investment banks representing sellers not create the appearance that
they desire buy-side work”).
93
See, e.g., In re Lear, 926 A.2d at 110-14 (evaluating whether the extent of
stockholder disclosure met fiduciary requirements); In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig.,
926 A.2d 58, 91-92 (Del. Ch. 2007) (scrutinizing stockholder disclosure).
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the past twenty years reveals that as long as the deal
protection devices do not effectively lock up the transaction,
the Delaware courts will bless whatever sale method is used.
A detailed description of significant market check cases
follows to clearly demonstrate the direction of Delaware Court
of Chancery jurisprudence regarding stockholder value
maximization over the past two decades.
1. In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litigation
In 1988, two years after the Delaware Supreme Court’s
decision in Revlon, the Court of Chancery first addressed the
validity of a post-signing market check in In re Fort Howard
Corp. Shareholders Litigation.94 In that case, Fort Howard’s
board, fearing that the company may be vulnerable to a
takeover attempt while its stock was temporarily depressed,
sought advice from its financial advisor, Morgan Stanley,
regarding steps the company could take to protect its
stockholders.95 Over the course of several meetings, Morgan
Stanley and Fort Howard determined that an LBO of the
company involving Morgan Stanley acting as a principal and
Fort Howard’s senior management also participating would
create a greater value than other alternatives.96 After

94
In re Fort Howard, 1988 WL 83147, at *1. Some commentators cite to a
preceding case, Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., 1988 WL 8772 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 1988),
as having first addressed the validity of a post-signing market check. Although the
merger agreement in that case contained a window shop provision and the target
company only seriously negotiated with one bidder prior to signing the agreement, the
plaintiffs did not specifically challenge the target’s reliance on a post-signing market
check but rather challenged the validity of the pre-signing auction process. Yanow,
1988 WL 8772, at *3-4. In particular, the plaintiffs challenged the target’s decision to
only negotiate with one bidder without having first conducted an auction or, at least,
having discreetly contacted third parties that had previously expressed an interest in
the target. Id. at *4. In addition, then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs also focused on the presigning market canvass in finding that although it was not clear that the market was
fully informed that the target was for sale, the “undisputed evidence [was] that for the
last two years, the relevant ‘players’ in the industry were aware that [the target] was
willing to (and, indeed, had) entertained acquisition proposals.” Id. at *6.
95
In re Fort Howard, 1988 WL 83147, at *2.
96
Id. During the initial meeting on March 30, 1988, Fort Howard’s CEO
asked about a wide range of transactions, including recapitalizations, spin-offs,
acquisitions and other transactions. Id. Morgan Stanley described the structure and
mechanics of different types of recapitalizations and then mentioned that an LBO of
the company with Morgan Stanley acting as a principal was also an alternative. Id. On
May 3, Fort Howard management requested Morgan Stanley to evaluate the company’s
possible alternatives and, three weeks later, Morgan Stanley presented a written
report at a meeting with management. Id. During this meeting, Morgan Stanley
indicated that in its opinion an LBO of the company would result in the greatest
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management presented the LBO proposal to the board, the
board formed a special committee that initially elected to keep
the buyout proposal confidential, although the company later
issued press releases regarding the negotiations.97 The special
committee retained an independent financial advisor, who
advised that if the board accepted an LBO proposal, the
proposal should provide for a market test to determine whether
a third party could make a better offer.98
Ultimately, Fort Howard and the Morgan Stanley group
entered into a merger agreement that included a no shop
provision allowing Fort Howard to receive third party proposals
but prevented management from actively soliciting alternative
offers.99 The agreement also included a topping fee and expense
reimbursement provision capped at $67 million, which
represented 1.9% of the equity value of the transaction.100
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the tender offer would
be publicly known for thirty business days, or forty-three
calendar days.101 Thus, the agreement essentially provided for a
forty-three day market check period, which came to be
standard in transactions following Fort Howard.
Upon execution of the merger agreement, Fort Howard
issued a press release that announced the transaction and
specifically stated that management was available to receive

stockholder value and again stated that Morgan Stanley would be interested in
participating in such a transaction with Fort Howard’s senior management. Id.
97
Id. at *3-5. On June 22, 1988, after the company received a telephone
inquiry regarding a rumor that there was a buyout being negotiated, Fort Howard
issued a press release stating that “members of [Fort Howard’s] management intend to
seek a proposal with third parties to acquire the Company in a leveraged buyout.” Id.
at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). On June 24, the company issued another
press release stating that it was engaged in negotiations with a group consisting of
members of its senior management and an affiliate of Morgan Stanley for an LBO, but
that there was no assurance that the transaction would come to fruition. Id. at *6-7.
98
Id. at *4-5. After receiving Morgan Stanley’s initial draft merger
agreement that included a proposal to purchase all of the outstanding company shares
for $50 per share and provided for a broad prohibition against shopping the company,
the special committee demanded a market test and indicated that it would not go
forward with the LBO unless there was time to test the market and there were fewer
restrictions on its ability to do so. Id. at *5-6. Among the other provisions in the initial
draft that the Special Committee rejected were provisions allowing for unspecified
break-up fees, unlimited expense reimbursement, and “a provision acknowledging
Morgan Stanley’s right to commence and complete any tender offer with[in] twenty
days from the announcement of its [definitive] agreement.” Id. at *5.
99
Id. at *7.
100
Id.; see also Morton & Houtman, supra note 27, at 2 (explaining the Fort
Howard deal’s protection provisions).
101
In re Fort Howard, 1988 WL 83147, at *6.
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inquiries from interested parties.102 Following the press release,
the company received eight inquiries from third parties, but
only two of the eight pursued the transaction further, including
a competitor of Fort Howard that ended up being the only third
party to seriously pursue a transaction with Fort Howard.103
When the competitor requested additional information beyond
the information provided to the other potential bidders, the
special committee expressed concerns that the competitor
would face significant antitrust problems and possibly
financing problems in acquiring Fort Howard.104 As a result
of these alleged concerns, the confidentiality/standstill105
agreement that the committee sought to have the competitor
execute contained several provisions that did not exist in the
Morgan Stanley confidentiality agreement. These provisions
included a fee of $67.8 million that the competitor would have
to pay if, after being provided with the additional confidential
information, the competitor did not make a bid, Morgan
Stanley’s tender offer did not close, and another bidder did not
appear.106
Fort Howard stockholders challenged the deal, arguing,
inter alia, that the independent committee had engaged in a
course of conduct that would never effectively allow it to shop
102

Id. at *7. In particular, the press release provided:

Notwithstanding its recommendation, and consistent with the terms of the
merger agreement, the Special Committee directed the Company’s
management and the First Boston Corporation to be available to receive
inquiries from any other parties interested in the possible acquisition of the
Company and, as appropriate, to provide information and, in First Boston’s
case in conjunction with the Special Committee, enter into discussions and
negotiations with such parties in connection with any such indicated interest.
Id. Following the press release, the Fort Howard transaction was prominently featured
in the business section of several publications, including the New York Times, Wall
Street Journal, and Los Angeles Times. Id. at *8.
103
Id. at *8. The Special Committee instructed its financial advisor to screen
the proposed bidders to determine if they were capable of completing a transaction of
this size. Id. After it was determined that all eight bidders could be considered serious
contenders, each received additional materials that had previously been provided to
Morgan Stanley. Id.
104
Id.
105
A standstill provision in a confidentiality agreement “prevents a
subsequent bidder who enters from becoming hostile to the target. The subsequent
bidder will typically be restricted from making a public tender offer and will, rather,
join a process in which the target's board is not only included, but will ultimately
choose its merger partner.” Block, supra note 23, at 93.
106
Id. at *9. During later negotiations, the special committee removed the
$67.8 million fee and offered another alternative that required the competitor to
submit a bid by August 5. Id.
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the company and that the market check period was really a
sham, pointing to the confidentiality/standstill agreement as
proof that the special committee favored the managementaffiliated transaction.107 In denying the plaintiffs’ request for a
preliminary injunction, then-Chancellor Allen noted that there
may be grounds for suspicion regarding the special committee’s
good faith, but under the totality of the circumstances, there
was not enough to find the shareholders’ argument
persuasive.108 Instead, Chancellor Allen focused on whether the
special committee’s post-signing market check was a mere
formality or whether it actually checked the market for
superior offers. The Chancellor blessed the post-signing market
check, finding that it “was reasonably calculated to (and did)
effectively probe the market for alternative possible
transactions” because it was not overly burdened by lock-ups,
termination fees, topping fees, time, or administrative
complications “to permit the inference that [the] alternative
was a sham designed from the outset to be ineffective or
minimally effective.”109 The court focused on the company’s
press release, the fact that a number of potential bidders
quickly expressed interest, and the company’s prompt provision
of information to bidders.110
Following its seminal decision in Fort Howard, the
Court of Chancery continued to consider the effectiveness of
post-signing market checks in a number of cases.111 The postsigning market checks of the late 1980s and early 1990s were
modeled after the Fort Howard market check and came to be
107

See id. at *10.
Id. at *12. Among other things, Chancellor Allen looked with suspicion on
the fact that the CEO, in effect, chose the members of the special committee and the
special counsel for the committee. Id.
109
Id. at *13. It is interesting to note, however, that Chancellor Allen found
the special committee’s initial decision to keep the management’s buyout proposal
secret to be suspicious, describing it as “a decision to sell the Company to management
if it would pay a fair price, but not to inquire whether another would pay a fair price if
management would not do so.” Id. at *12. Chancellor Allen explained that this decision
implied a bias on the part of the special committee. Id.
110
Id. at *13.
111
See, e.g., Kohls v. Duthie, 765 A.2d 1274, 1285 (Del. Ch. 2000); Goodwin v.
Live Entm’t, Inc., No. Civ.A. 15765, 1999 WL 64265, at *23 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 1999);
Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC Holdings, Inc., 729 A.2d 280, 291 (Del. Ch. 1998);
In re Vitalink Commc’ns Corp. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 12085, 1991 WL 238816, at
*7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1991); Roberts v. Gen. Instrument Corp., Civ. A. No. 11639, 1990
WL 118356, at *8-9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990); Braunschweiger v. Am. Home Shield
Corp., Civ.A. No. 10755, 1989 WL 128571, at *6-7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1989); In re KDI
Corp. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 10,278, 1988 WL 116448, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1,
1988).
108
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characterized by termination fees ranging from 1.9% to 3.83%112
and, often times, press releases announcing, or at least
implying, that the company was open to receiving inquiries
from other bidders.113 In addition, in these transactions,
matching rights were not necessarily always provided to the
initial acquirer.114 There appears to have been a seven-year gap
during which the Court of Chancery was not presented with a
case involving post-signing market checks but the court began
to address them again in 1998.
2. In re Pennaco Energy, Inc.
More recently, in 2001, the Court of Chancery again
visited post-signing market checks in In re Pennaco Energy,
Inc.115 In that case, Pennaco Energy’s stockholders challenged
the board’s decision to not actively shop the company and to
112
See, e.g., Kohls, 765 A.2d at 1285 (refusing to enjoin a deal with a
termination fee of 2.25% of the equity value of the transaction); see also Kenetech
Corp., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Form 8-K, exhibit 2), at 1, 14, 44 (Oct. 26, 2000)
(filing Merger Agreement, dated October 25, 2000, containing capitalization
representation stating that 31,970,164 shares of common stock were issued and
outstanding, merger consideration of $1.04 per share and termination fee of $750,000);
Goodwin, 1999 WL 64265, at *20 (refusing to enjoin a deal with a termination fee equal
to 3.125% of the merger value plus $1 million in expenses for a total percentage of
4.16%); Matador Capital Mgmt., 720 A.2d at 291 (refusing to enjoin a deal with a
termination fee of approximately 3.83% of the equity value of the transaction); In re
Vitalink, 1991 WL 238816, at *7 (finding that a termination fee equal to 1.9% of the
equity value of the transaction did not prevent a market canvass); Roberts, 1990 WL
118356, at *9 (refusing to enjoin a deal with a termination fee equal to 2% of the equity
value of the transaction); Braunschweiger, 1989 WL 128571, at *7 (refusing to enjoin a
deal with a termination fee equal to $0.25 per share, or 1.9% of the equity value of the
transaction).
113
Compare Kenetech Corp., Press Release (Form 8-K, exhibit 99.1), at 1 (Oct.
26, 2000) (explicitly stating that Kenetech’s financial advisor was available to receive
unsolicited inquiries), and In re KDI, 1988 WL 116448, at *4 (summarizing a press
release stating that the target’s special committee and its financial advisor would
continue to be available to receive inquiries and would negotiate with third parties),
with Roberts, 1990 WL 118356, at *6 (quoting a press release stating that the
incumbent bidder would be paid a termination fee if the target receives an unsolicited
offer and accepts the offer in accordance with the board’s fiduciary duties), and
Braunschweiger, 1989 WL 128571, at *9 n.13 (quoting a press release stating that the
incumbent bidder would be paid a termination fee if the target’s board withdraws its
stockholder recommendation and accepts another offer in accordance with its fiduciary
duties). But see BRC Holdings Inc., Press Release (Form SC 14D1, exhibit 9), at 1 (Oct.
23, 1998) (filing a press release containing no indication, either explicit or implicit, that
the company was willing to entertain offers from third parties). The BRC Holdings
transaction became the subject of the litigation in Matador Capital Management, 729
A.2d at 291.
114
See, e.g., In re MCA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 598 A.2d 687, 693 (Del. Ch. 1991)
(no matching rights); In re Vitalink, 1991 WL238816, at *7, 10 (same); In re KDI, 1988
WL 116448, at *3 (same).
115
787 A.2d 691, 705-07 (Del. Ch. 2001).
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rely exclusively on a post-agreement market check.116 Unlike
Fort Howard, Pennaco concerned a strategic transaction—not
an LBO. In November 2000, Pennaco and a subsidiary of
Marathon Oil entered into a confidentiality agreement after
Marathon expressed an interest in acquiring Pennaco.117 After
entering into the confidentiality agreement, Pennaco’s board
focused solely on Marathon and did not attempt to canvass the
market even though the confidentiality agreement did not
prohibit Pennaco from doing so.118 A little over a month after
entering into the confidentiality agreement, the parties
executed a merger agreement.119 The merger agreement
included a relatively non-restrictive no shop provision that
allowed Pennaco to speak with and provide information to any
third party who could reasonably “be expected to make a
superior offer that could be consummated without undue
delay.”120 In addition, Marathon was granted matching rights
that allowed Marathon a three-day period during which it
could match a superior proposal.121 The agreement also
contained a termination fee equal to 3% of Pennaco’s equity
116

Id. at 692.
Id. at 698.
118
Id. at 699. Pennaco also did not hire an investment bank to canvass the
market for it. Id. However, Pennaco’s management identified investment bankers for
possible retention should a transaction arise with Marathon or another party, and
Pennaco received pitch books from two of the banks that it contacted, including Credit
Suisse First Boston (“CSFB”). Id. CSFB provided Pennaco with preliminary valuation
analyses and indicated a range in value for Pennaco between $17.88 and $20.81 per
share. Id.
119
Id. at 702. After completing three weeks of due diligence, Marathon
submitted its initial bid of $17 per share. Id. at 700. The Pennaco board determined
that Marathon’s bid was too low, given CSFB’s preliminary valuation, and instructed
Pennaco’s CEO to reject the $17 offer and “to seek a price ‘north of $20 a share.’ ” Id. A
week after its initial offer, Marathon increased its bid to $19 per share. Id. at 701. The
board again met and instructed the CEO “to see if there was ‘any more room above the
$19 a share.’” Id. At that meeting, the board also hired Lehman Brothers as its
investment bank. Id. After Marathon indicated that $19 a share was its absolute best
and final offer, the board authorized Lehman to begin working on a fairness opinion
and discussed its fiduciary duties and possibilities for a post-agreement market check
with its outside counsel. Id. Lehman gave an oral presentation to the board regarding
its fairness opinion, during which it presented net asset valuations based on three
different “base cases,” the most aggressive of which produced a range of value of $15.14
to $18.89 per share. Id. at 702 (internal quotation marks omitted). Following its
presentation, Lehman gave an oral opinion that Marathon’s $19 per share offer was
fair and the board then formally approved a sale of Pennaco to Marathon at $19 per
share. Id.
120
Id.
121
See Pennaco Energy, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Form 8-K,
exhibit 2.1), at 38-39 (Dec. 27, 2000), (filing Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of
December 22, 2000, that included a three-business-day matching rights period in
Section 8.01(d)).
117
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value and slightly less than 3% of the value of its combined
debt and equity as measured by the transaction value.122
Furthermore, in order to allow sufficient time for third parties
to review the transaction and make competing offers, the
Pennaco board obtained an agreement from Marathon that it
would not commence its tender offer until the second week of
January 2001.123
In addressing the Pennaco stockholders’ challenges that
the Pennaco board breached their Revlon duties by solely
negotiating with Marathon and by relying on a post-agreement
market check with a termination fee, Vice Chancellor Strine
first noted that “one would not commend the Pennaco board’s
actions as a business school model of value maximization”
before finding that the board’s actions were reasonable.124
Strine validated the board’s single bidder strategy because the
board ensured that a post-agreement market check would occur
and because the termination fee and matching rights did not
act as substantial barriers to third parties.125 Although he
found the board’s actions to be reasonable, it is noteworthy that
Vice Chancellor Strine indicated that had the board agreed to
more onerous deal protection devices that prevented competing
bids from emerging, his decision would likely have been
different.126
3. In re MONY Group Inc. Shareholder Litigation
Three years after its decision in Pennaco, the Delaware
Court of Chancery again addressed the necessity of a presigning auction and the adequacy of a post-signing market
check in In re MONY Group Inc. Shareholder Litigation.127 Like
Pennaco, MONY also did not involve an LBO but rather a
122

In re Pennaco, 787 A.2d at 702, 702 n.16.
Id. at 703.
124
Id. at 705. In reaching the conclusion that the board’s actions were not
unreasonable, Strine relied on numerous factors, including: (1) Pennaco’s market
posture, including that the company was a “source of industry interest”; (2) Pennaco’s
recent search for a joint venture partner that had “brought the company to the
attention of twenty to thirty industry players”; (3) the company’s “reincorporation into
Delaware to facilitate its participation in the mergers and acquisitions market”; and (4)
the board members’ expertise and experience in the industry. Id. at 705-06.
125
Id. at 707 (holding that the fact that no higher bids emerged “is itself
‘evidence that the directors, in fact, obtained the highest and best transaction
reasonably available’” (quoting Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC Holdings, Inc.,
729 A.2d 280, 293 (Del. Ch. 1998)).
126
Id. at 707.
127
852 A.2d 9, 20-21, 23-24 (Del. Ch. 2004).
123
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strategic transaction. In MONY, MONY Group Inc.
stockholders challenged the proposed stock-for-cash merger of
MONY and a wholly-owned subsidiary of AXA Financial, Inc.128
After MONY posted losses in 2001 and 2002, the company’s
board of directors authorized its CEO, Michael I. Roth, to
explore strategic opportunities but rejected the idea of a public
auction of the company.129 Approximately ten months after
Roth first met with AXA, MONY and AXA announced they had
signed a merger agreement pursuant to which MONY
stockholders would receive $31 cash for each share of MONY
stock.130 The merger agreement contained a window shop
provision which prohibited MONY from actively soliciting offers
during the five-month market check period but allowed the
board to pursue proposals that were, or were reasonably likely
to constitute, a more favorable business combination to
stockholders and that was reasonably capable of being
completed on the proposed terms.131 In addition, AXA was
granted a five-day period during which it could match a
superior proposal.132 The merger agreement also contained a
termination fee of $50 million, which represented 3.3% of
MONY’s total equity value and 2.4% of the total transaction
value.133 The MONY stockholders challenged the board’s
decision to forego a pre-signing auction or solicitation process
and also challenged the adequacy of the post-signing market
check.134
In finding that the board’s decision not to pursue a preagreement auction was reasonable, Vice Chancellor Lamb
stated that “[s]ingle-bidder approaches offer the benefits of
protecting against the risk that an auction will be a failed one,
and avoiding a premature disclosure to the detriment of the

128

Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 16. In November 2002, the board met with its financial advisor,
CSFB, to discuss MONY’s financial issues. Id. CSFB’s report to the board suggested
twelve potential partners and acquirers for MONY, including AXA Financial. Id.
130
Id. at 18. This price represented a 7.3% premium over MONY’s thencurrent trading price of $28.89. Id.
131
Id. at 23 n.31.
132
See The MONY Group Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Form 8-K,
exhibit 2.1), § 9.1(h), at 59-60 (Sept. 18, 2003) (filing Agreement and Plan of Merger,
dated as of September 17, 2003, that included a five-business-day matching rights
period).
133
In re MONY, 852 A.2d at 18.
134
Id. at 20, 23.
129
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company’s then-ongoing business.”135 In addition, the court held
that the five-month period between the merger agreement
signing and the date on which the MONY stockholders brought
suit was more than adequate for a competing bidder to emerge
and complete due diligence.136
Although the Court of Chancery continued to scrutinize
the board’s activities in light of the totality of the
circumstances, there were a number of facts that differentiated
the more recent market checks validated in Pennaco and
MONY from the first market check that the court upheld in
Fort Howard.137 Unlike Fort Howard, neither Pennaco nor
MONY issued a press release explicitly stating that the target’s
management was available to field third party inquiries.138 In
addition, some practitioners have noted that the termination
fees upheld in both Pennaco and MONY were not only higher
than the Fort Howard termination fee but were also
significantly higher than termination fees contained in other
deals involving post-signing market checks in the absence of a
market canvass.139 Finally, unlike in Fort Howard, the initial
bidders in both Pennaco and MONY received matching rights
in the event of a superior third party proposal.140 A practitioner

135

Id. at 21. Vice Chancellor Lamb indicated that the MONY board considered
several factors in deciding not to engage in an active solicitation process. Id. These
factors included (1) the previous attempt by another company engaged in the same
industry whose business and stock market performance suffered after undergoing a
public auction; (2) the risk that MONY’s employees would seek alternative
employment; (3) the risk that competitors would gain a competitive advantage after
performing due diligence on MONY and would seek to employ MONY’s career agency
force; and (4) the knowledge that a post-agreement market check was a possibility. Id.
136
Id. at 23-24.
137
See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (stating
that a board’s actions “must be evaluated in light of relevant circumstances to
determine if they were undertaken with due diligence and in good faith”).
138
Compare text at supra note 102 (quoting a Fort Howard press release that
explicitly stated that management was available to field unsolicited third party offers)
with Pennaco Energy, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 27, 2000) (press release
that does not mention management’s availability to field unsolicited third party offers,
nor does the press release mention the inclusion of a window shop provision in the
merger agreement), and The MONY Group Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 18,
2003) (same).
139
See Morton & Houtman, supra note 27, at 3-4 (noting that the Pennaco fee
of 3% and the MONY fee of 3.3% were higher than the Fort Howard fee of 1.9% and
were much higher than similar situations in the past involving a sale of control to a
single bidder without a pre-signing market canvass).
140
See The MONY Group Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 59-60 (Sept. 18,
2003) (filing Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of September 17, 2003, that
included a five-business-day matching rights period in Section 9.1(h)); Pennaco Energy,
Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 38-39 (Dec. 27, 2000) (filing Agreement and Plan of
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at one Delaware law firm theorized that the differences
between Pennaco, MONY and Fort Howard are a result of
Pennaco and MONY involving strategic buyers while Fort
Howard involved an MBO.141 In any event, some commentators
believe that this liberalization of market checks paved the way
for the recent prevalence of the go-shop provision.142
D.

2004-2007: The Development of the Go-Shop

Until recently, the window shop provision was the
medium of choice for boards seeking to ensure the
maximization of stockholder value in the absence of a public
auction or targeted market canvass. Dealmakers rarely used
go-shop provisions, and when they chose to use them it was
generally only under special circumstances.143 Richard E. Spatt,
a partner at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, has indicated
that these “special circumstances” include situations “where an
insider or fiduciary/board member is the buyer” or where the
price terms of a deal have been renegotiated downward.144
The Delaware Court of Chancery first addressed goshops in its 1989 opinion, In re Formica Corp. Shareholders
Litigation.145 The go-shop provision in that case arose during
the MBO of Formica Corp. and permitted the unlimited
solicitation and negotiation of competing acquisition proposals
during the thirty business day, or forty-seven calendar day,
period that the tender offer was open.146 The deal, entered into
after a very limited market canvass, included a $5 million
termination fee representing approximately 2.14% of the equity
value of the transaction and a provision capping expense

Merger, dated as of December 22, 2000, that included a three-business-day matching
rights period in Section 8.01(d)).
141
See Michael K. Reilly, The Post-Agreement Market Check Revisited (Mar.
2004), available at http://www.potteranderson.com/news-publications-40-45.html
(arguing that differences between the three cases are a result of Pennaco and MONY
involving a strategic third party who may not be as familiar with the target and as a
result incurring higher sunk costs).
142
See Morton & Houtman, supra note 27, at 5 (stating that following
Pennaco and MONY post-signing market checks “began fading into the background
and a new approach—the go-shop provision—started to take hold”); see also Spatt,
supra note 13, at 33 (stating that go-shops are natural extensions of no shops).
143
See Spatt, supra note 13, at 33-40 (describing the rise of the go-shop
provision).
144
Id.
145
CIV.A. No. 10598, 1989 WL 25812 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 1989).
146
Id. at *8.
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reimbursement at $5.5 million.147 The press release announcing
the transaction explicitly stated that Formica’s financial
advisor had been instructed to “actively solicit competing
bids.”148
The stockholders challenged the post-signing market
test as being incapable of resulting in a meaningful auction,
arguing that the length of the market test period was an
insufficient time for incoming bidders to arrange complex
foreign financing.149 However, then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs
rejected this argument for several reasons. First, Jacobs noted
that bidders do not require foreign financing unless they need
debt financing and, even then, bidders could make their bids
subject to securing financing and temporarily finance the
acquisition using a bridge loan.150 Second, Jacobs stated that
there was “no evidence that any potential bidder . . .
complained that the . . . period [was] too truncated to enable a
bid to be made.”151 Finally, Vice Chancellor Jacobs compared
the go-shop provision to the no shop provision in Fort Howard
and found the facts of Formica to be “more compelling” because
the target could actively solicit potential bidders, the target’s
financial advisor had contacted 125 potential bidders and was
engaged in discussions with four of them, and “the market test
period [was] one week longer than the one employed in Fort
Howard.”152
Following Formica in 1989, only a handful of deals over
the subsequent decade and a half contained go-shops.153 This
147
In re Formica Corp. S’holders Litig., 1989 WL 25812, at *3-4, *8
(describing the exploratory discussions and the terms of the final merger agreement).
The special committee considered holding an auction but rejected the idea, fearing
that it may not end up with any bids. Id. at *6.
148
Id. at *7.
149
Id. at *12.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id. The tender offers in Formica and Fort Howard both remained open for
thirty business days although the Formica tender offer was open for four calendar days
longer than the Fort Howard tender offer. Compare In re Fort Howard S’holders Litig.,
Civ. A. No. 9991, 1988 WL 83147, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) (stating that the tender
offer would remain open for thirty business days or forty-three calendar days) with In
re Formica, 1989 WL 25812, at *8, *12 (stating that the tender offer would remain open
for thirty business days or forty-seven calendar days and such time constituted the
market check period).
153
See, e.g., Spatt, supra note 13, at 33 (indicating that the 1991 acquisition
by non-executive chairman of National Gypsum included a go-shop provision); Kemper
Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2-3 (July 1, 1994) (summarizing a merger
agreement allowing for a ten-day go-shop period with a bifurcated termination fee
pursuant to which Kemper could terminate the agreement in favor of a third party).
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scarce use of go-shops is likely a product of the collapse of the
high-yield bond market and the resulting substantial decline in
LBOs in 1989 and 1990.154 Then, beginning in 2004, dealmakers
began including go-shops in a rising number of deals.155 During
2006, dealmakers included go-shops in at least fifteen deals.156
This sudden increased use of go-shops may lead one to
ask: what has changed that dealmakers are turning to goshops? The answer to this question is likely the result of a
combination of factors. As discussed in Part I, over the past
three years, there has been a resurgence in the number of
private equity firms entering the playing field.157 In contrast to
transactions with strategic players, private equity firms often
bring different considerations to the negotiating table. Private
equity firms frequently deal with targets that have not
necessarily considered themselves as being for sale.158 Private
equity firms, like other buyers, prefer having private
negotiations with the target company and thus often avoid
competitive auctions, which frequently result in increasing the
purchase price of the target.159 Accordingly, a private equity
firm may make its proposal contingent on the target not
shopping the deal prior to entering into a definitive
agreement.160 However, in return for abstaining from shopping
154
See Steven N. Kaplan, The Evolution of U.S. Corporate Governance: We Are
All Henry Kravis Now, J. PRIVATE EQUITY, Fall 1997, at 7, available at
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/steven.kaplan/research/govern.pdf (discussing the decline
of LBOs and the reasons for the decrease).
155
See, e.g., The Chalone Wine Group, Ltd., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov.
1, 2004) (filing merger agreement with a go-shop provision and press release
announcing Chalone may continue to solicit bids); Hollywood Entertainment Corp.,
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 14, 2004) (filing amended merger agreement with goshop provision and press release announcing that according to amended merger
agreement that included a renegotiated price, Hollywood Entertainment was permitted
to entertain competing proposals); US Oncology, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar.
22, 2004) (filing merger agreement with a go-shop provision and press release
announcing that US Oncology may continue to solicit competing bids).
156
See Morton & Houtman, supra note 27, at app. 7-18 (listing transactions
that included go-shop provisions in their agreements).
157
See supra Part. I (discussing increase in private equity deals).
158
See Peters et al., supra note 69 (“[A] target board may be faced with a
situation in which, although it has no intention to sell, it is approached by an
unsolicited bidder who makes an offer that the board is compelled to consider.”).
159
See Thomas J. Dougherty, Takeovers, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY:
SECURITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING AND STRATEGY 327, 330 (2007) (“[O]nce p-e [private
equity] players commit to a potential deal, they would rather proceed from a bear hug
offer that dazzles management through to deal closure with as little competitive
bidding as possible.”).
160
See, e.g., In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 104 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(recognizing that the private equity buyer indicated that it would pull its bid if a “fullblown auction” were conducted).

556

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:2

the deal pre-signing—and in recognition that the target board
has an obligation to fulfill its Revlon duties—private equity
firms will agree to go-shop provisions.161 Because the private
equity firm has secured its place as the initial acquirer it is
able to benefit from the other deal protection devices that the
agreement often contains, including termination fees and
matching rights. Furthermore, although the target is, in effect,
conducting an auction post-signing, go-shop periods are not
generally as long as public auctions.162 Therefore, the initial
acquirer is able to avoid a pre-signing bidding war, secure an
agreement and then the target is put on the auction block for a
more limited period.
In addition to the private equity buyers’ avoidance of
public auctions, the target board may harbor concerns that a
public auction or pre-signing market canvass will not be
effective in inducing bids when a private equity firm has
already made a proposal. Boards may fear that third parties
will be hesitant to compete with a buyout group that includes
target insiders, or that management may not cooperate with a
public auction because it is already aligned with the private
equity buyer.163 Furthermore, boards also may be concerned
about the market for corporate control’s perception that the

161
See Michael Weisser & Michael Cubell, Go-Shops: Are Sponsors Giving
Away the Store?, PRIVATE EQUITY ALERT (Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP), Dec. 2006, at
1, 3-4, http://www.weil.com/wgm/cwgmhomep.nsf/Files/PEADec06/$file/PEADec06.pdf
(describing reasons that private equity buyers agree to go-shop provisions).
162
See Mills & Harsch, supra note 12, at 45 (recognizing the time differences
required for public auctions and typical go-shop periods).
163
See Stephen I. Glover & Jonathan P. Goodman, Go-Shops: Are They Here to
Stay?, M&A LAW., June 2007, at 1 (describing reasons boards may agree to go-shop
provisions when a private equity firm has made a buyout proposal). This argument
may have some weight, as Professor Guhan Subramanian, in an article summarizing
an empirical study of go-shop provisions, states that:

The fact that no higher bidder has emerged in an MBO go-shop to date
(after nearly two years of experience with go-shops, in a frenzied deal
environment) suggests that third parties may be wary of entering a
bidding contest, or that bankers might not conduct as thorough and
energetic a search, when management has already picked its preferred
buyout partner. A management team with difficult-to-acquire firmspecific skills and knowledge can use their inherent advantage to buy
the company from the public shareholders at a lower price, by
effectively committing to its favored buyout group and making clear its
unwillingness to work with any other buyout group that might emerge
during the go-shop process.
Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shops v. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and
Implications (forthcoming BUS. LAWYER, May 2008).
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board itself is favoring the private equity buyer.164 In the
opinion of the board, the inclusion of a go-shop provision in the
final agreement helps to mitigate the perception that the board
or management may be biased in favor of the private equity
buyer.165
In addition to the increased role that private equity
firms are playing in the M&A world and the related issues that
LBOs and MBOs raise, stockholder activism also has been on
the rise.166 Stockholders are increasingly willing to challenge
deals that, in their opinion, do not maximize stockholder
value.167 Although stockholder suits overall have decreased in
recent years, suits challenging deals involving private equity
firms have doubled over the past three years.168 As a result,
boards are increasingly turning to go-shop provisions in an
effort to show that they have and are continuing to fulfill their
Revlon duties.169
E.

Typical Characteristics of Go-Shop Provisions

As mentioned previously, go-shops allow the target
company to actively solicit other bidders post-signing for a
limited period, generally ranging from fifteen to fifty days.170
Agreements containing go-shop provisions also typically
contain deal protection devices such as termination fees and
matching rights. Termination fees are often bifurcated; that is,

164

See Glover & Goodman, supra note 163.
See id.
166
See generally Battling for Corporate America—Shareholder Democracy,
THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006, at 63 (describing an environment of shareholder
activism).
167
Christopher Palmeri, Saying No to an LBO, BUS. WEEK, July 23, 2007,
at 26.
168
Id.; see also Wong, Rival Bidders, supra note 22 (stating that stockholders
increasingly react with hostility toward private equity deals).
169
See Dan Freed, They’ve Shopped, But Haven’t Dropped: First-Half M&A
Sizzled, and the Second Half Is Already Off to a Fast Start. Is It Too Much of a Good
Thing?, INV. DEALERS’ DIG., July 9, 2007 (“The emergence of the ‘go shop’ appears to be
symptomatic of a larger concern among boards that they be seen as doing whatever
they can on behalf of shareholders.”); Glover & Goodman, supra note 163 (“Yet another
factor explaining the rise of the go-shop is increased shareholder activism by
institutional investors and hedge funds.”).
170
See Morton & Houtman, supra note 27 (providing a table listing
transactions containing go-shop provisions, including details regarding the length of
the go-shop periods). Typically, go-shop provisions do not limit who may be solicited
during the go-shop period. Glover & Goodman, supra note 163. However, in a few deals
targets have been limited to contacting a select group of strategic buyers or a limited
number of bidders generally. Id.
165
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a lower termination fee will apply during the go-shop period
than following the go-shop period. The lower termination fee
generally ranges from 40% to 60% of the base termination
fee.171 Some deals have allowed the lower termination fee to
apply only if the target terminated the original agreement
“prior to the expiration of the go-shop period,” while other deals
permit the lower termination fee to apply so long as the target
company terminated the original agreement in favor of a
superior proposal that was received during the go-shop
period.172 Go-shop provisions are also often paired with
matching rights, allowing the initial acquirer an opportunity to
match any bids received as a result of a target’s solicitation
during the go-shop period.173 Finally, following the expiration of
the go-shop period, target companies are subject to no shop and
fiduciary out provisions.174 Therefore, following the expiration
of the go-shop period, the target may no longer actively solicit
bids. Although the target may consider superior proposals, the
higher base termination fee would apply to bids received after
the expiration of the go-shop period.175
III.

EFFECTIVENESS OF GO-SHOP PROVISIONS AND
RECENT DELAWARE JURISPRUDENCE

A.

Intended Advantages and Related Criticisms of
Go-Shop Provisions

As the use of go-shop provisions increases, so has the
attention that the provisions are receiving from the M&A
community. Law firms have issued a number of client
memoranda discussing and often questioning the efficacy of goshops.176 The rise of the go-shop has not been lost on the
business press, which has also expressed skepticism regarding
171

See Glover & Goodman, supra note 163 (describing bifurcated termination

fees).
172
See Kevin M. Schmidt, Private Equity: Current M&A Issues for Buyers, in
EIGHTH ANNUAL PRIVATE EQUITY FORUM 99, 106, 110 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice,
Course Handbook Series No. 1614, 2007) (summarizing transactions containing
bifurcated termination fees).
173
See id. at 110 (describing recent transactions including go-shops and
matching rights).
174
See id. at 105, 106.
175
See id. at 106, 110.
176
See, e.g., Paul Kingsley & Mutya Harsch, Go-Shop Provisions: A New
Trend?, PRIVATE EQUITY NEWSL. (Davis Polk & Wardwell), Dec. 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.dpw.com/1485409/dpw/12_07_06_PrivateEquityNews_dec_06.pdf; Morton &
Houtman, supra note 27, at 6-7; Weisser & Cubell, supra note 161, at 4-5.
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the benefits of go-shop provisions. In particular, commentators
have debated the effectiveness of go-shop provisions in
inducing third party bids and have questioned a board’s ability
to adequately fulfill its Revlon duties by utilizing the
provisions. This section seeks to summarize the purported
advantages and related criticisms of go-shops.
1. Effectiveness of Go-Shop Provisions in Inducing
Third Party Offers
One of the purported benefits of go-shop provisions is
that they enable the target company to have a form of
insurance in change of control transactions. In other words, goshop provisions allow the target to conduct an open auction,
but because a signed deal already exists, the target avoids the
risks involved with a potentially failed public auction.177
However, a full-blown pre-signing auction and a post-signing
auction are not created equal. In contrast to public auctions
where all bidders are on equal footing, post-signing market
checks, particularly those resulting from go-shop provisions,
provide several advantages to the incumbent bidder. The
foremost advantage is that the initial acquirer begins the
auction in first place and, thus, gains the benefits derived from
its first place position, including the traditional deal protection
devices contained in the definitive merger agreement.178
Therefore, critics argue that third party bidders are less likely
to emerge post-signing because of the protections conferred
upon the initial acquirer in the merger agreement.179 However,
proponents contend that go-shop provisions may be more
effective than traditional market checks because bidders are
more likely to emerge post-signing if they are actively
solicited.180
177
See Go-Shop, POCKET MBA (PLI), Aug. 8, 2007 (stating that go-shops
provide targets with the benefits of an open auction without risk).
178
See Kingsley & Harsch, supra note 176 (stating that the initial acquirer is
in an “enviable first place position as the preferred buyer”).
179
Id. at 7-8 (summarizing arguments that go-shop provisions do not induce
third party bidders).
180
Id. at 6-7 (stating that some proponents contend that third parties are
more likely to propose a bid post-signing if they are actively solicited to do so). In
addition, commentators point out that, in contrast to the typical fiduciary out provision
where companies have to wait for unsolicited superior proposals, “[g]reater
transparency and openness is accomplished when the target is allowed to actively
pursue other offers.” Block, supra note 23, at 108 (summarizing advantages and
disadvantages of go-shop provisions).
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Because go-shop provisions have traditionally been used
in LBOs and MBOs, critics assert that there are additional
reasons that the provisions are not successful in adequately
maximizing stockholder value. Specifically, they argue that
both private equity firms and strategic buyers may be hesitant
in making a proposal when the initial acquirer is a private
equity firm. In particular, some experts have suggested that
private equity firms operate on an unwritten gentlemen’s
agreement that they will not jump another private equity
firm’s signed deal.181 That is, they act on a sort of “what goes
around comes around” mentality, most likely because they tend
to engage in several deals a year, and the possibility exists that
they could see the same private equity firm on the next deal.182
Vice Chancellor Strine referenced this mentality recently,
stating that it is “a reality that there is not a culture of
rampant topping among the larger private equity players, who
have relationships with each other that might inhibit such
behavior.”183 Nonetheless, in the aggressive world of M&A
participants, it is hard to imagine that, given the right
circumstances, a private equity group would not jump a deal
for fear of future retribution, even if they consider it to be in
bad form to do so.184 In fact, it already appears as if the market
is heading in that direction. Recently, an affiliate of Apollo
Management L.P., a private equity firm, successfully jumped

181
See Janet Morrissey, A Private Equity Peak?, TIME, July 19, 2007 (stating
that the deal jumping among private equity firms is considered a faux pas and quoting
Chris Young, Director of M&A Research at Institutional Shareholder Services, as
saying, “It has long been suspected that there is an unwritten gentleman’s agreement
among private-equity firms to refrain from jumping each other’s deals”); see also Freed,
supra note 169 (noting that private equity firms have not outbid other private equity
firms in the context of a go-shop provision). Rob Kindler, Vice Chairman of M&A at
Morgan Stanley, has stated, “If boards are told go shops’ [sic] are likely to make other
private equity firms outbid a signed private equity deal, they’re being misinformed.” Id.
182
See Glover & Goodman, supra note 163 (stating that private equity firms
may be reluctant to jump a signed deal when they may see the other private equity
buyer in the next deal). The same sort of unspoken or unwritten gentlemen’s
agreement does not appear to exist among strategic players in today’s M&A
environment. Even the Court of Chancery has recognized that “strategic buyers have
not felt shy about ‘jumping’ friendly deals crafted between their industry rivals.” In re
Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1008 (Del. Ch. 2005). This is likely
because strategic buyers are not engaging in the same number of transactions as
private equity firms.
183
In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 121 (Del. Ch. 2007).
184
Vice Chancellor Strine also has expressed doubt as to whether “such a
culture . . . can persist given the powerful countervailing economic incentives at
work.” Id.
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an MBO of EGL, Inc., a global freight transportation
provider.185
Like private equity buyers, strategic buyers may also be
hesitant in jumping a signed LBO or MBO. In particular,
critics argue that strategic buyers may decide not to jump
deals where the target company’s management is already
aligned with the private equity buyer who is planning to retain
management and who may be offering management additional
equity stakes following completion of the proposed
transaction.186 Therefore, a strategic buyer may harbor
concerns that it will not have enough time to assemble a
different management team or that its offer would not be
successful because it is not willing to offer management the
same potential benefits.187
Others simply contend that go-shop provisions are
unnecessary, pointing out that because of the media scrutiny
that going-private transactions receive, potential strategic and
financial buyers are fully aware that the target company is “in
play.”188 As a result, there is no need for the target company to
actively solicit bids post-signing and the boards can simply rely
on the traditional window shop provision.189
Still others point out that go-shop provisions make the
incumbent bidder a stalking horse for its own transaction
which they argue actually makes the target company more
desirable to third parties.190 In addition, the target company is
185
See EGL, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), May 24, 2007 (describing EGL’s
termination of a merger agreement with a CEO-led group and entry into a merger
agreement with an Apollo Management affiliate after EGL determined that the Apollo
affiliate’s offer constituted a superior proposal).
186
See Glover & Goodman, supra note 163; see also In re Netsmart Tech., Inc.
S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 198 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[S]trategic buyers might sense that
CEOs are more interested in doing private equity deals that leave them as CEOs than
strategic deals that may . . . not.”). Vice Chancellor Strine has indicated that in
deciding whether to submit a bid, strategic buyers consider the profits that
management is likely to obtain in a proposed deal. See id.
187
See Glover & Goodman, supra note 163.
188
See Weisser & Cubell, supra note 161, at 3-4 (describing factors that initial
acquirers weigh before agreeing to go-shop provisions); Michael Weisser & Matthew
Cammack, Shepherding the Deal, THE DEAL, Mar. 30, 2007 (“[M]any question the
practical need of go-shop provisions, particularly when private equity deals grab
headlines and pricing and other material terms are often spelled out on the front pages
of financial and other publications, thus drawing competing bids with little or no
solicitation by the target.”).
189
See Weisser & Cubell, supra note 161, at 3-4; Weisser & Cammack, supra
note 188 (stating that because of the extensive publicity most private equity deals
have, competing bids are obtained with “little or no solicitation by the target”).
190
See Kingsley & Harsch, supra note 176 (describing the role the initial
acquirer assumes as a “stalking horse”).
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able to lock in a sale price. That is, the initial acquirer’s bid
sets the floor for any third party bids.191 However, incoming
third party bidders still must determine whether to submit a
bid while taking into account the value of the underlying
transaction and the related deal protection devices in the
signed agreement. Thus, to have an opportunity to be a
successful bidder post-signing, the third party’s bid must at
least meet the initial acquirer’s bid plus an additional amount
taking into account the termination fee for the transaction.192
Proponents of go-shops argue that the provisions may
actually aid the target in achieving maximum stockholder
value. They reason that once the initial acquirer agrees to
the inclusion of a go-shop provision, the initial acquirer is
incentivized to offer the highest possible price in order to avoid
a post-signing bidding war and the possibility that the deal
may be successfully “jumped.”193
2. Sufficiency of the Go-Shop Period in Preparing
Superior Proposals and Other Timing
Considerations Relating to Go-Shops
Commentators also consider the ramifications of the goshop period. For instance, some question whether a third party
has the legitimate opportunity to prepare a competitive
superior proposal during the limited go-shop period. For
example, a bid that is higher than the proposed transaction but
is contingent on “obtaining financing” would likely not be
deemed a superior proposal to a fully financed pre-existing
LBO.194 However, the typically limited duration of the go-shop
period may not provide a third party with sufficient time to
secure financing.195 Furthermore, there is a risk that financing
may not be available because the initial acquirer has already
191
See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Looking for More Money, After Reaching a Deal,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, at 34 (stating that initial acquirer acts as a “stalking horse”
and sets the base price for potential bidders).
192
For a further discussion of how termination fees work in practice, see
supra Part II.A.3.
193
See Glover & Goodman, supra note 163 (arguing that a small number of
topping bids may be due to an initial acquirer’s incentive to pay full price fearing that
the deal may be lost during a go-shop period).
194
See Dougherty, supra note 159, at 331 (“[I]f such competitors overbid
‘subject to obtaining financing,’ they run the risk that their premium priced bid will be
deemed ‘not-superior’ to the fully financed p-e bird in the hand.”).
195
See id. at 330 (stating that the typical go-shop period may not provide a
buyer with enough time to arrange financing).
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taken advantage of the existing financing opportunities or has
engaged the limited number of banks that can offer such a
financing package to the point where the banks are conflicted
from working with another buyer.196 Thus, in such a situation,
the go-shop provision will not result in a superior proposal.
In addition, the professed timing benefits of go-shop
provisions may not be that great. Go-shop provisions
purportedly allow parties to streamline the purchase process by
permitting parties to forego a public auction or pre-signing
market canvass. Instead, the parties can first enter into a
definitive agreement and then the target company can begin
the auction process while also working to satisfy the closing
conditions with the initial acquirer.197 However, critics point out
that go-shops force the target’s management to balance its time
between the post-signing auction and the fulfillment of closing
conditions, including the time-consuming tasks of proxy
preparation and other filing preparations.198 As a result,
although time may be saved on the front-end, critics contend
that the period between signing and closing may be longer than
in traditional post-signing market check situations.199
Another timing consideration is that by quickly entering
into a deal that includes a go-shop provision, the initial
acquirer may immediately begin taking steps towards closing,
including preparing regulatory filings and advancing the
stockholder approval process.200 Thus, the initial acquirer is
able to place itself in a position to be able to close the proposed
transaction faster than a third party that enters post-signing.201
As a result, go-shop provisions may have the unintended
impact of making the target’s management and board favor the
initial acquirer over a third party because the initial acquirer is
in a more competitive position to close the transaction.

196
See id. (“[A] financed competitive bid assumes that financing has not been
‘dried up’ in advance by a p-e bidder team that strategically pre-shopped financing
opportunities to the market’s main financing sources but not the bid itself.”).
197
Schmidt, supra note 172, at 107 (describing purported timing advantages
of go-shops).
198
See id.
199
Id.
200
See Mills & Harsch, supra note 12, at 46 (describing possible time benefits
for the initial acquirer).
201
See id.
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3. Effectiveness of Go-Shop Provisions in Reducing
Stockholder Litigation
As previously discussed, boards are turning to go-shop
provisions in an effort to avoid increasingly active stockholders
challenging proposed transactions and specifically challenging
whether the boards have fulfilled their Revlon duties. Some
commentators argue that the provisions allow boards to more
easily fulfill their fiduciary duties because they remain open to
higher offers.202 However, other commentators argue that the
provisions are illusory and that the provisions are simply
“window dressing,” the inclusion of which allows boards to
argue that they have fulfilled their duty to maximize
stockholder value although the boards may not be making
additional efforts to do so.203 It appears that go-shop provisions
will not shield boards from stockholder suits as two recent
Delaware Court of Chancery cases demonstrate: in both cases
the stockholders challenged the adequacy of the market check
when the boards relied on the inclusion of go-shop provisions.
B.

Recent Delaware Court of Chancery Decisions Allowing
Companies to “Shop Like Paris Hilton”204 During
Extended Store Hours

Despite expressing skepticism regarding the value of goshop provisions less than three months earlier at the Tulane
Corporate Law Institute, Vice Chancellor Strine issued two
back-to-back opinions that, like then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs’
decision nineteen years earlier in Formica, seemingly blessed
the use of go-shop provisions as a technique for maximizing
stockholder value.205
1. In re Topps Co. Shareholders Litigation
The first, In re Topps Co. Shareholders Litigation,
involved the Michael Eisner-led private equity buyout of Topps
202

See Block, supra note 23, at 108 (detailing arguments in favor of go-shops).
See id. at 108-09 (describing criticisms of go-shop provisions).
204
In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 86 (Del. Ch. 2007).
205
See David Marcus, The New Auction Rules, DAILY DEAL, Apr. 16, 2007
(stating that Vice Chancellor Strine recognizes that go-shops “rarely produce much of
anything for anyone, including shareholders”); David Marcus, Auctions, Conflicts and
Go-shops, Oh My!, DAILY DEAL, Apr. 20, 2007 (recounting the highlights of the 2007
Tulane Corporate Law Institute conference and describing Vice Chancellor’s Strine’s
statements regarding go-shops provisions).
203
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Co., a manufacturer of baseball cards and the distributor of
Bazooka gum.206 Although the deal was not technically an
MBO, the Eisner proposal ensured the retention of the majority
of the company’s key employees and senior management,
including the CEO and Chairman’s son-in-law who served as
the company’s President and Chief Operating Officer.207 Topps’s
ten-member board included three directors nominated by an
insurgent stockholder whom Strine referred to as the
“Dissident Directors” because the three directors did not agree
with the “Incumbent Directors” on many issues, including the
Eisner proposal.208
Under Eisner’s proposal, a pre-signing auction or
market check was not acceptable although Eisner was willing
to accept a go-shop provision.209 As a result, the merger
agreement included a provision that “gave Topps the chance to
shop the bid for 40 days after signing, and the right to accept a
‘Superior Proposal’ after that, subject only to Eisner’s receipt of
a termination fee and his match right.”210 The agreement also
included a bifurcated termination fee that amounted to 3.0% of
the transaction value during the go-shop period and 4.6% of the
transaction value after the go-shop period.211
The board formed an executive committee, which
consisted solely of the five Incumbent Directors, to evaluate
offers during the go-shop period.212 The only responsibility the
entire board, including the Dissident Directors, had with
respect to the go-shop period was to evaluate whether a
competing offer was actually a superior proposal or was likely
to become one.213 At the beginning of the go-shop period,
Topps’s financial advisor “contacted 107 potential strategic and
financial bidders, [of which] five expressed interest in Topps
206

In re Topps, 926 A.2d at 60-61 (describing Topps’s business and the merger
agreement between Eisner and Topps).
207
Id. at 60, 61, 73-74. This is of particular consequence because Topps had
previously been the subject of a proxy contest designed to remove three directors,
including CEO and Chairman, Arthur Shorin, who was also the grandson and nephew
of the company’s founders. Id. at 60-61, 68. In fact, Eisner first approached Shorin
during the proxy contest. Id. at 61, 68.
208
Id. at 61. The board approved the Eisner merger 7-3, with the Dissident
Directors making up the three dissenting votes. Id. at 71.
209
Id. at 61, 70.
210
Id. at 61.
211
Id. at 66.
212
Id. at 71. The board formed the executive committee after the majority of
the board determined that the Dissident Directors could not sufficiently represent the
company’s interests because they had voted against the Eisner merger. Id.
213
Id.
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and began a due diligence review.”214 The only bidder that
seriously continued to pursue Topps was Upper Deck—the one
true competitor of Topps—who submitted a bid two days before
the expiration of the go-shop period.215 The Topps board met
after the go-shop period expired and determined that Upper
Deck was not an “Excluded Party” under the terms of the
agreement, which would have allowed Upper Deck and Topps
to continue talks past the expiration of the go-shop period.216
The Topps board based its decision on concerns regarding
Upper Deck’s ability to finance the transaction, the risk that
the transaction may be delayed or prevented by antitrust
authorities, and Upper Deck’s failure to sufficiently assume the
antitrust risk and the small reverse termination fee proposed
by Upper Deck.217 Following the board’s decision, Upper Deck
made a new, unsolicited offer that was accompanied by a letter
from Upper Deck’s financial advisor and potential lender
stating that it was “highly confident” that it could finance the
transaction.218 Upper Deck’s new proposal also offered to divest
key licenses if required to do so by antitrust regulators and also
was accompanied by an antitrust expert’s letter addressing
Topps’s unspecified antitrust concerns.219 The Topps board
determined that the unsolicited offer was not a superior
proposal for similar reasons.220 The board also rejected Upper
Deck’s request to be released from the standstill agreement
that prevented Upper Deck from making public any
information about its discussions with Topps and also
prevented Upper Deck from launching a tender offer for Topps
shares without the Topps board’s permission.221

214

In re Topps, 926 A.2d at 71.
Id. The Upper Deck bid was for $10.75 cash per share, $1 more per share
than the Eisner proposal. Id. Upper Deck’s proposed merger agreement was based on
the Eisner merger agreement but deleted all representations and warranties relating
to Upper Deck’s ability to finance the merger, deleted a covenant requiring Upper Deck
to divest assets in order to obtain regulatory and antitrust approvals, and included an
affirmative right not to be required to divest assets in order to obtain regulatory
approval. Id. In addition, Upper Deck included a “due diligence out” provision pursuant
to which Topps would have to provide Upper Deck with any additional information that
Upper Deck requested and that conditioned the transaction on Upper Deck’s
satisfactory review of due diligence. Id.
216
Id. at 72.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id. at 90.
220
Id. at 72-73.
221
Id. at 62.
215
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Although Vice Chancellor Strine granted Upper Deck’s
motion for a preliminary injunction, Topps “won” with respect
to the deal protection devices, including the go-shop provision,
which Strine found to be reasonable.222 Despite his earlier
questioning of go-shops,223 Strine did not acknowledge that the
Delaware courts had not addressed these provisions in recent
years, nor did he cite to Formica in upholding the go-shop
provision. Instead, Strine appeared to treat the go-shop
provision as if it were a Fort Howard post-signing market
check and stated that because the board had not performed a
pre-signing market check, it properly obtained a go-shop
provision.224
Strine indicated that go-shops may be useful in inducing
other bids because the existence of a “credible, committed”
initial acquirer may act as a form of “sucker’s insurance” for
others to take the leap and submit a bid.225 Thus, Strine
adopted the argument urged by proponents of go-shops that the
provisions foster positive psychological effects in helping to
stimulate bids.226 In addition, Vice Chancellor Strine stated
that although Eisner had been granted a matching right, the
right was not a barrier to other bidders because matching
rights have been overcome in the past.227 Strine also recognized
that although a target might want a longer go-shop period or a
lower break-up fee, the deal protection devices “left reasonable
room for an effective post-signing market check. For 40 days,
the Topps board could shop like Paris Hilton.”228
Although Strine did not scrutinize the board’s reliance
on a go-shop provision, he looked at the board’s actions during
the go-shop period more closely. Strine found that the board’s
222

Id. at 86-87, 93.
See supra note 205 and accompanying text (describing Strine’s questioning
of go-shop provisions).
224
In re Topps, 926 A.2d at 86.
225
Id. at 87.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 86.
228
Id. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, after the expiration of the goshop period, Topps could no longer talk to bidders “unless the bidder had already
submitted a ‘Superior Proposal’ or the Topps board determined that the bidder was an
‘Excluded Party’” (i.e., a party that the board determined was “reasonably likely to
make a Superior Proposal”). Id. at 65. Topps could also consider bids after the forty-day
period, if the bid was a superior proposal or was “reasonably likely to lead to one.” Id.
Strine also found that if a bidder felt as if it needed more time, it could obtain the
information it needed during the go-shop period and then submit an offer after the
period expired and resume the process. Id. at 86-87. Thus, Strine seemed to imply that
the two periods worked in tandem to create a longer go-shop period. See id.
223
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decision not to treat Upper Deck as an “Excluded Party” so that
it could negotiate further with Upper Deck after the go-shop
period was “highly questionable” and suggested that the
Incumbent Directors favored Eisner who promised to retain
management.229 Strine further criticized Topps’s lack of a good
faith effort to negotiate with Upper Deck and Topps’s misrepresentation of facts regarding Upper Deck’s offer that were
included in Topps’s public disclosure, including public criticism
of Upper Deck’s offer.230 Furthermore, Strine determined that
Topps’s refusal to release Upper Deck from the standstill
threatened Topps’s stockholders’ informed decision-making
because Upper Deck was unable to tell its own version of the
story.231 As a result, Strine granted a preliminary injunction
delaying the merger vote until Topps granted Upper Deck a
waiver of the standstill so that that Upper Deck could make a
tender offer and communicate with Topps stockholders.232
2. In re Lear Corp. Shareholders Litigation
A day after Topps, Vice Chancellor Strine issued a
second opinion, In re Lear Corp. Shareholders Litigation, in
which the Vice Chancellor again issued a preliminary
injunction delaying the merger vote until additional disclosure
could be made, but blessed the parties’ inclusion of a go-shop
provision in the merger agreement.233 That case stemmed
from a Carl Icahn-led LBO of Lear Corp., a troubled company
in which Icahn had obtained a 24% holding in 2006.234 In
November 2006, concerned about his personal financial
security, Lear’s long-time CEO, Robert E. Rossiter, approached
Lear’s compensation committee about accelerating his retirement benefit payments which had a fully vested value of $14.6
million.235 The compensation committee hired a compensation
229
In re Topps, 926 A.2d at 89-90. Strine also emphasized that when Upper
Deck proposed a materially higher price than the Eisner proposal, the board seemed
“more bent on coming up with obstacles to securing that higher value” rather than
reacting with enthusiasm at the possibility of enhancing stockholder value. Id. at 88.
230
Id. at 91.
231
Id. at 92.
232
Id. at 92-93.
233
In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 97-98 (Del. Ch. 2007).
234
Id. at 97, 100. Icahn planned to use an affiliated entity, American Real
Estate Partner, LP, to consummate the transaction. Id. at 102.
235
Id. at 100. The retirement benefits would vest in 2011 when Rossiter
turned 65; however, Rossiter could access $10.4 million of his SERP benefits by mid2007 if Rossiter retired. Id.
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consulting firm that “presented five potential options to allow
Rossiter to liquidate his retirement assets quickly while
keeping his job.”236 The consulting firm indicated that no matter
which option Rossiter were to choose, he was likely to face
criticism from investors for accelerating his own benefits
during a difficult period for the company.237 Rossiter, however,
did not have to choose among the five options because, in
January 2007, Icahn proposed a going-private transaction in
which existing management would be retained.238 The special
committee that was formed following Icahn’s proposal allowed
Rossiter to negotiate price terms without the presence of Lear’s
financial advisor or the special committee.239
The Lear board debated whether the company should
engage in a formal auction but ultimately rejected the idea
fearing that it would disrupt business and that, more
importantly, Icahn may pull his offer as Icahn had indicated
that he would do if the company engaged in a full-blown
auction.240 The board instead directed Lear’s financial advisor
to engage in a four-day limited pre-signing canvass by
contacting eight financial buyers who had an interest in the
automotive sector, the industry in which Lear engages.241 Five
of the financial buyers who were contacted expressed “tepid
‘maybes,’” but none made a preliminary proposal or expressed
a desire to pursue due diligence.242 A few days after the limited
market canvass, Lear entered into a merger agreement with
Icahn that included a forty-five day go-shop provision and
fiduciary out that allowed Lear to accept a superior proposal
following the expiration of the go-shop period.243 In addition, the
agreement contained a bifurcated termination fee amounting to
2.79% of the equity value of the deal if the agreement was
terminated during the go-shop period, or 3.52% of the deal
equity value if the agreement was terminated following the
expiration of the go-shop period.244 Icahn also was granted
236

Id. at 100-01.
Id. at 101.
238
Id.
239
Id. at 102-03.
240
Id. at 104.
241
Id. at 104-05.
242
Id. at 105.
243
Id. at 105, 107.
244
Id. at 107. The agreement also provided that a termination fee was payable
if the Lear board withdrew its recommendation for the merger or failed to reconfirm its
support for the merger if it were requested to do so. Id.
237
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matching rights which allowed Icahn ten days to determine
whether to increase his offer to match a superior proposal.245
Lear’s financial advisors began to contact potential buyers as
soon as the merger agreement was executed.246 They contacted
a total of forty-one potential buyers, twenty-four financial
sponsors and seventeen strategic buyers, of which only eight
buyers entered into confidentiality agreements to begin due
diligence.247 However, unlike in Topps, none of the buyers
contacted ultimately made a preliminary bid nor did Lear
receive any unsolicited bids during the go-shop period.248
Lear stockholders sought a preliminary injunction
arguing that the Lear board did not disclose all material facts
necessary for the stockholders to decide whether to approve the
merger and that the Lear board failed to make a reasonable
effort to maximize stockholder value.249 With respect to the
Revlon claims, Strine stated that Rossiter should have
informed the board of Icahn’s proposal earlier and that the
special committee should have taken a larger role in the
negotiation process, particularly in light of Rossiter’s personal
interests in the going-private transaction.250 However, Strine
concluded that the overall approach taken by the special
committee appeared to have been reasonable.251 In finding that
the Lear board’s decision not to engage in a full public auction
was reasonable, Strine indicated that Lear’s elimination of its
poison pill and Icahn’s investment in Lear were signals to the
market that it was “perfectly obvious that Lear was open to
invitations.”252
Vice Chancellor Strine likewise rejected the plaintiffs’
argument that the go-shop provision combined with the other
deal protection devices had the effect of chilling bids.253
However, in reaching that determination, Strine admittedly
245
In re Lear, 926 A.2d at 108. Icahn’s offer was for $36 per share. Id. at 105.
If the superior proposal was greater than $37 per share, Icahn only had one chance to
match. Id. at 108. However, if the superior proposal was not greater than $37 per
share, Lear had to give Icahn “three days to match each successive [superior] proposal.”
Id. If Icahn decided not to match a superior proposal, Icahn agreed to vote his block of
shares in favor of the superior proposal. Id.
246
Id. at 105.
247
Id. at 106.
248
Id. at 106-07.
249
Id. at 109-10.
250
Id. at 118.
251
Id.
252
Id. at 118-19.
253
Id. at 120.
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gave the bifurcated, or two-tiered, termination fee “relatively
little weight.”254 Strine acknowledged that most bidders would
have been able to take advantage of the lower termination fee
offered during the go-shop provision because it required the
third party to “get the whole shebang done within the 45-day
window.”255 Strine found that the 3.52% termination fee was
reasonable because it was not of the level that would deter a
serious bid.256 Strine treated Icahn’s matching rights similarly
stating that matching rights “are hardly novel” and have been
upheld even when coupled with termination fees.257
Like his decision in Topps, Vice Chancellor Strine
treated the Lear plaintiffs’ disclosure claims with skepticism.258
Although Strine was careful to say that Rossiter did not act
inappropriately, Strine found that Rossiter’s personal
motivations for favoring a going-private transaction should
have been included in the proxy statement.259
3. Impact of Topps and Lear
Although Strine continually stresses that Court of
Chancery decisions are not intended to create bright-line rules
254

Id. at 119.
Id. at 119-20. To take advantage of the lower termination fee, Strine stated
that the third party would have to
255

do adequate due diligence, present a topping bid with a full-blown draft
merger agreement, have the Lear board make the required decision to
declare the new bid a superior offer, wait Icahn’s ten-day period to match,
and then have the Lear board accept that bid, terminate its agreement with
Icahn, and “substantially concurrently” enter into a merger agreement with
it. All of these events had to occur within [the forty-five-day go-shop
provision] . . . .
Id. at 119.
256

Id. at 120.
Id. In reaching this conclusion, Strine relied on the defendants’ citation of
over fifteen transactions that were jumped despite a termination fee exceeding 3%
paired with matching rights. Id. at 120 n.21; see also The AREP Defendants’
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Application for a Preliminary
Injunction at 28-29, In re Lear, 926 A.2d 94, 2007 WL 2125317. The majority of the
deals cited by defendants involved traditional no shop and window shop provisions
rather than go-shop provisions. Affidavit of Daniel R. Fischel, exhibit O, In re Lear, 926
A.2d 94, 2007 WL 2801493.
258
In re Lear, 926 A.2d at 114-15.
259
Id. at 114. On July 16, 2007, Lear’s stockholders voted against the Icahn
buyout. See Lear Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K, exhibit 99.1) (July 17, 2007) (filing
press release announcing that Lear stockholders had voted against the Icahn merger).
This stockholder vote represents only the eighth U.S. deal (out of more than 1000 U.S.
deals requiring consent) that stockholders have voted against since 2003. See Terry
Kosdrosky, Lear Vote Is Big Bet on Detroit, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2007, at A2.
257

572

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:2

that dealmakers must follow in every deal, Strine’s cursory
review of the go-shop provisions in Topps and Lear send a
signal to dealmakers that go-shops are acceptable provisions to
depend upon in future transactions.260 However, as the next
section details, the effect of go-shop provisions is likely not that
different than that of traditional post-signing market checks
with respect to value maximization. In fact, both sale methods
reveal that the Delaware courts are moving in the opposite
direction from the purer bidding process announced in Revlon.
IV.

SHOPPING DURING “EXTENDED STORE HOURS”: NOT SO
DIFFERENT FROM NOT SHOPPING AFTER ALL

Although commentators have noted Strine’s cursory
review of the go-shop provisions in Topps and Lear, they have
failed to recognize Strine’s implicit recognition that we have
come full circle since the 1980s when the Delaware Supreme
Court announced that the board should act as auctioneers in
sale of control transactions. Neither in Formica, nor in Lear
and Topps, did either vice-chancellor draw a distinction
between go-shop provisions and the post-signing market checks
blessed in the Fort Howard line of cases that relied on deal
protection devices, such as no shop and window shop
provisions.261 I contend that this was not simply an oversight on
the part of the Delaware Court of Chancery. Instead, it reflects
the simple acknowledgment that despite all of the hoopla
surrounding the recent prevalence of go-shop provisions, and
the questioning of their effectiveness, the end result of the go260
See Sheri Qualters, Strine Theory, NAT’L L.J., July 30, 2007, at 1
(summarizing Vice Chancellor Strine’s opinion that deal tactics must change as
companies’ circumstances change). Strine’s cursory review and failure to differentiate
go-shops from no shops may well be a result of the lag time that frequently occurs
between the use of a particular deal mechanism and the courts’ opportunity to review
the mechanism. Because of the dynamic nature of M&A and the fact that dealmakers
are often utilizing new deal tactics and new twists on transaction structures before
they are blessed by the courts, many deals close prior to the courts having an
opportunity to review the actions of dealmakers. In a similar context, Professor
Edward R. Rock has commented that as a result of this lag time, Delaware courts are
placed in the position of not being able to deem the dealmakers’ tactics or new
transaction structures per se illegal. Rock, supra note 7, at 1096-97 (theorizing that
because of the significant number of MBOs in the 1970s and 1980s, by the time the
Delaware Court of Chancery could have an “opportunity to articulate standards,” the
court could not find MBOs per se illegal). Beyond finding a particular deal tactic per se
illegal, Delaware courts are presented with the situation where the actions or tactics
used in a deal are not necessarily ideal but the courts may be hesitant to issue an
injunction without a great showing of unreasonableness.
261
For a discussion of the Fort Howard line of cases, see Part II.C.
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shop provision is the same as the post-signing market check
with respect to value maximization.
As described previously, a no shop provision with a
fiduciary out, or a window shop provision, does not allow the
active solicitation of third party offers. However, a no shop
accompanied by a fiduciary out permits a target board to
participate in negotiations with a third party who submits an
unsolicited offer that is, or may become, a superior proposal. In
contrast, the go-shop provision allows the active solicitation of
such offers and effectively moves the auction process to the
post-signing. However, these facial dissimilarities are where
the differences between the two sale methods end.
Targets have relied exclusively on both the post-signing
market check and go-shop provisions in situations where they
have negotiated solely with one bidder pre-signing, or
conducted only a limited pre-signing market canvass, as in Fort
Howard, Pennaco, MONY, Lear, and Topps. According to one
survey, which analyzed thirty transactions including go-shop
provisions, the target companies in nearly every transaction
surveyed did not first conduct a pre-signing market canvass
prior to entering into the merger agreement.262 Similarly,
Delaware courts have upheld post-signing market checks when
the target did not first conduct a pre-signing market canvass.263
Thus, the same criticisms regarding the favoritism of boards
and management and resulting bid chilling effects of go-shop
provisions can be equally applied to post-signing market
checks. For example, the possibility remains that using go-shop
provisions to fulfill a board’s Revlon duties could “permit
management to insulate its last period decisions from the
constraint of the market for corporate control.”264 There is a risk
that management and boards who may have ulterior motives
could use go-shop provisions to go with the suitor of their
choice rather than the bidder who may present a superior offer.
Stated differently, go-shop provisions present the danger of
allowing a board to “hide” behind a go-shop despite not having
shopped the company pre-signing. However, the same risks
exist in the now standard post-signing market check situation,
262

See Morton & Houtman, supra note 27, at 1 n.1 (describing results of

survey).
263

See, e.g., In re MCA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 598 A.2d 687, 693 (Del. Ch. 1991)
(upholding reliance on post-signing market check after initial merger agreement was
publicly negotiated for two months and no other bidders came forward).
264
Griffith, supra note 40, at 1963.
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and the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed such
allegations of favoritism in Fort Howard.265
Moreover, critics’ arguments that go-shops are
ineffective at inducing superior proposals because of barriers to
entry that a signed transaction present also hold true in
situations where the target relies only on a post-signing market
check. Like third parties who are contacted during a go-shop
period, third parties that enter during a post-signing market
check also encounter deal protection devices like termination
fees and matching rights and also are constrained by the preclosing period. The Delaware courts, however, address only
whether these mechanisms are too onerous that they would
completely prevent bidders from “jumping” in post-signing.
In fact, as we have seen, the continuing trend in the
Delaware courts is to consider the sale process as a whole and,
in particular, the reasonableness of the board’s decisions in
light of the totality of the circumstances. As the Delaware
courts have done since the 1980s, Lear and Topps demonstrate
the courts’ continued focus on the role of management in
negotiations. For example, the courts scrutinize whether there
were conflicts of interest present and whether the
management’s decisions were motivated by entrenchment.266
Although the Delaware courts may express skepticism and
suspicion regarding a board’s or special committee’s actions,
the courts are, in effect, powerless to prevent such an action
without a very persuasive showing of bad faith by the
plaintiffs.267 The same powerlessness applies no matter if a
post-signing market check or a go-shop provision is utilized to
determine whether the board has selected the best deal for the
target’s stockholders.268 Instead, the Delaware courts tend to
265
See In re Fort Howard Corp. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 9991, 1988 WL
83147, at *10-11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) (summarizing plaintiffs’ arguments that the
special committee favored the management-affiliated transactions).
266
See supra Part III.B.
267
See, e.g., In re Fort Howard, 1988 WL 83147, at *12-13 (finding the good
faith of the special committee to be suspect, but that the committee’s actions were not
enough to indicate bad faith); see also supra note 108 and accompanying text
(describing Chancellor Allen’s suspicion in Fort Howard of the CEO’s and special
committee’s activities and Allen’s finding that the showing of bad faith was not
sufficient).
268
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, what really may be needed
in order to curb the possibility of a board or management’s own selfish greed is, in the
words of former U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Donaldson,

a change in mindset—one that fosters not only a “culture of compliance” but
also a company-wide environment that fosters ethical behavior and decision-
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use their decisions to comment on behavior that they find to be
suspicious so that dealmakers will tend to shy away from such
activity in future transactions.269
As a result of this trend in Delaware jurisprudence, over
the past two decades we have moved from an initial focus on
fully shopped deals that include fiduciary outs simply to ensure
that the directors do not violate their post-signing fiduciary
duties, to a more exclusive reliance on the fiduciary out model
to sell the company. We then moved from the fiduciary out
model to go-shop provisions that in effect allow an auction to be
conducted post-signing. This movement appears to be in direct
opposition to Revlon where the Delaware Supreme Court
chastised the parties for ending a heated bidding contest and
held that a fiduciary out must be included in the definitive
agreement. Although Revlon seemed to be the start of a trend
towards fostering a more competitive bidding process, the
Delaware courts’ decisions allowing much, if not all, of the sale
process to take place post-signing does not foster such a heated
bidding process when deal protections in the merger agreement
act to discourage bids. Realistically, what board of directors
would not be inclined to rely on go-shop provisions in the

making. Creating that culture means doing more than developing good
policies and procedures . . . . It means instilling an ethical culture—a
company-wide commitment to do the right thing, this time and every time—
so much so that it becomes the core of what I call the essential “DNA” of the
company.
William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Remarks to the National Association of
Securities Dealers (May 12, 2004), transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch051204whd.htm.
269
See Rock, supra note 7, at 1095-96 (stating that the advisory opinion-like
nature of Delaware opinions are helpful to dealmakers in planning transactions, but
they are problematic because of their fact-specific nature); Qualters, supra note 260,
at 1 (quoting Vice Chancellor Strine as stating, “People learn from the cases, that’s
what’s good about them . . . . It’s a low-cost opportunity.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Professor Rock has theorized:
This reactive stance, combined with what I claim to be a fairly self-conscious
attempt by the courts to shape the standards of conduct in a rapidly
developing transactional form, may be the driving force behind judicial
attempts to surpass it. Thus, the “preachiness” of Delaware MBO opinions,
the pattern of criticizing conduct even when no injunction is issued, and
judges’ extrajudicial utterances can all be read as attempts to be heard on a
critical matter in the absence of a case raising just the right issue and in the
absence of the articulation (or articulability) of a governing rule. Such
utterances are, in a literal sense, advisory opinions.
Rock, supra note 7, at 1095.
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absence of a public auction or targeted market canvass?270 The
long-term implications of the go-shop provision could very well
be that the pre-signing public auction or more limited market
canvass may go by the wayside as the Delaware courts have
allowed such processes to be conducted post-signing.
V.

CONCLUSION

In many ways we have come full circle since the merger
wave of the 1980s and the Delaware Supreme Court’s
landmark opinion in Revlon. The 1986 ruling in Revlon
appeared to begin a movement toward a “pure” auction process
that would result in achieving the best possible price for
stockholders. The Delaware courts have recognized that a
public auction or, at least, a targeted market canvass that
occurs pre-signing, are the best ways to achieve value
maximization. These methods allow potential buyers to bid on
a target company before deal protection devices and other
concerns work to inhibit bidding. However, less than two years
after Revlon, the Delaware Court of Chancery authorized the
almost exclusive reliance on no shop provisions coupled with
fiduciary outs, or, in other words, a post-signing market check,
to achieve value maximization. The Delaware courts have
continued to validate these post-signing market checks while
focusing on the sale process as a whole.
Over the past three years, the passive post-signing
market check has given way to go-shop provisions allowing
target companies to actively shop themselves post-signing,
when they would have otherwise been prevented from doing so.
In effect, these provisions permit targets to extend their “store
hours” and have moved the auction process post-signing.
Critics have attacked these provisions as ineffective at
maximizing stockholder value for various reasons, including
that the provisions do not induce bids because of pre-existing
deal protection devices and because the provisions allow target
companies to favor the initial bidders, who are often private
equity firms that are seeking to retain management or are
providing management with certain compensation packages or
270

An exception likely exists for small micro-cap companies, who after the
Delaware Court of Chancery’s ruling in Netsmart, need to engage in a more complete
targeted market canvass rather than rely on a post-signing market check as a sale
method. For a discussion of sale methods with respect to micro-cap companies, see
supra notes 83-85 accompanying text.
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other incentives following closing. This Article contends,
however, that the end result of the go-shop is really no
different from the more passive post-signing market check that
permits a company to terminate the agreement in favor of a
superior proposal but does not allow the target to actively shop
the company. The same criticisms can apply equally to both
sale methods and active bidding can be inhibited due to deal
protection devices when either sale method is utilized. The
implications of this movement in Delaware jurisprudence
toward reliance on post-signing market checks and go-shops
results in the failure to use methods that encourage an active
bidding process and the maximization of stockholder value.
Because the Delaware courts do not focus on these sale
processes but rather only check that the methods used are not
so onerous that they would result in locking up a transaction,
the courts have shifted their attention away from the policies
promoted by Revlon. The exclusive reliance on go-shop
provisions to sell a company and achieve the highest price for
stockholders signals the death of the movement toward a purer
competitive bidding process that first began over twenty years
ago in Revlon.

